/  i  n  £  tin 

SPEECH 


OF 


OF  PENNSYLVANIA, 


IN  REPLY  TO 

MR.  CURRY,  OF  ALABAMA, 

ON 

POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY, 

AS  AVOWED  BY 

JUDGE  DOUGLAS. 


<>  rs  / 

3  *  * 


an  h 

fv  j  {t  S 


DELIVERED  IN  THE  HOUSE  OF  REPRESENTATIVES,  MARCH  29,  1  360, 


The  House  being  in  the  Committee  of  the  "Whole  on  the  state  of  the  Union — Mr. 

MONTGOMERY  said: 

Mr.  Chairman:  Some  days  since,  at  a  time  when  I  was  absent  from  this  Ilonse,  the  gen' 
tleman  from  Alabama  (Mr.  Curry)  delivered  a  speech  in  which  he  discussed  the  question 
of  popular  sovereignty,  and  especially  the  views  of  Judge  Douglas  on  that  question,  i 
regret  that  I  was  not  present  to  hear  the  remarks  of  the  honorable  gentleman  ;  because, 
when  he  speaks,  I  am  always  an  attentive  and  instructed  listener,  and  because  I  would 
have  at  once  sought  the  floor  to  have  replied.  Since  then  I  have  been  unremitting  in  my 
efforts  to  secure  the  floor  for  that  purpose,  and  this  is  the  earliest  day  at  which  I  could 
succeed. 

The  honorable  gentleman  is  an  able  reasoner  and  an  elegant  writer.  He  is  generally 
well  prepared  before  he  attempts  to  speak,  and  often  writes  out  his  remarks  in  full,  in  terse 
old  English ;  and  he  reads  and  speaks  with  a  force  and  clearness  which  give  Him  an  influ¬ 
ence  and  popularity  which  his  talents  and  industry  richly  merit.  This  very  popularity,  if 
nothing  more,  requires  that  his  remarks  should  be  replied  to.  And  this  duty  seems  espe¬ 
cially  to  be  demanded  from  me.  I  am  one  of  the  delegates  at  large  from  the  great  State  of 
Pennsylvania,  which  recently,  at  the  Reading  convention,  reasserted  its  unshaken  faith  in 
the  doctrine  of  non-intervention  by  Congress  in  the  legislation  of  the  Territories.  And,  in 
addition,  I  am  one  of  the  northern  Democratic  Representatives  that  has  invariable  agreed 
with  Judge  Douglas  in  the  views  he  has  held,  and  holds  now,  on  that  question.  I  there¬ 
fore,  on  my  own  responsibility,  and  in  self-defence,  deem  it  my  duty  to  reply  to  the  remarks 
of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama.  I  sincerely  deprecate  this  discussion.  I  regret 
that  the  gentleman  from  Alabama  has  thought  proper  to  drag  our  little  party  differences 
into  discussion  on  the  floor  of  Congress.  This  is  not  the  place  in  which  those  differences 
can  be  adjusted.  Nor  is  this  the  time,  when  an  active,  vigilant,  powerful  enemy  is  in  the 
field  seeking  our  overthrow,  to  stir  up  civil  war  in  our  ranks.  The  voice  of  every  friend 
of  the  party  and  of  the  country  should  now  be  raised  in  snpport  of  harmony,  concession, 
and  united  action.  I  regard  this  discussion  as  unwise,  ill-timed,  and  impolitic.  It  is  an 
act  of  treason  to  the  best  interests  of  the  party,  and  gives  aid  and  comfort  to  the  enemy. 
All  such  differences  should  be  referred  to  the  great  national  council  of  the  party,  which, 
will  soon  assemble  at  Charleston,  for  the  adjustment  and  determination  of  such  questions. 
But  the  gentleman  from  Alabama  has  thought  proper  to  refuse  to  submit  the  controversy 
to  that  tribunal.  He  risks  the  consequences,  and  lias  given  the  first  blow  ;  and  justice  to 
ourselves  demands  that  we  should  return  it. 

The  gentleman  from  Alabama  has  fairly  made  the  issue  on  which  the  presidential  nom¬ 
ination  is  to  be  determined.  Vie  do  not  seek  to  disguise  it;  on  the  contrary. we  proclaim 
it,  and  mean  to  stand  by  it.  Judge  Douglas  would  scorn  to  obtain  the  Presidency  on. 
false  pretenses.  He  stands  now  where  he  has  stood  for  the  last  ten  years — unchanged  ar.d 
unchangeable.  He  has  inscribed  on  his  banner  the  great  doctrine  of  “non-intervention 


Printed  by  Lemuel  Towers,  at  $1  00  per  hundred  copies. 


2 


by  Congress  in  the  legislation  of  a  Territory.”  All  his  opponents,  on  the  contrary,  with¬ 
out  exception,  have  inscribed  on  theirs  ‘‘intervention  by  Congress  to  establish  and" protect 
slavery  in  the  Territories.”  That  is  the  issue;  and  we  are  willing  to  meet  it  here,  as  we 
will  meet  it  at  Charleston.  I  desire  delegates  from  the  northern  States  to  remember,  that 
this  is  the  issue  —  the  only  issue  —  to  be  met  in  the  national  convention.  I  am  resolved 
that  gentlemen  shall  not  misrepresent  nor  misunderstand  this  matter.  Judge  Douglas 
alone  of  all  our  candidates  maintains  the  doctrine  that  Congress  shall  nor  interfere  in  the 
legislation  of  a  Territory,  either  for  or  against  slavery.  All  his  competitors  take  the 
ground  that  Congress  has  the  right,  and  it  is  its  duty,  to  intervene  to  protect  slavery  in 
the  Territories  wherever  the  Territorial  Legislatures  neglect  or  refuse  so  to  do. 

Permit  me  to  explain  what  is  meant  by  Congressional  intervention.  The  honorable 
gentleman  from  Alabama,  and  those  who  agree  with  him,  hold  that,  under  the  Constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  United  States,  tke  slaveholders  of  the  South  have  a  right  to  emigrate  into  the 
Territories,  and  take  their  slaves  with  them.  And  he  and  they  hold,  further,  that  if  the 
people  of  the  Territory  do  not  want  slavery,  and  if  their  Territorial  Legislature  shall 
neglect  or  refuse  to  pass  laws  to  protect  such  slave  property,  or  if  they  pass  laws  either 
to  abolish  or  to  discourage  slavery,  in  any  of  these  cases  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  Con¬ 
gress  to  pass  laws  to  protect  slavery  in  such  Territory.  If  this  principle  is  adopted,  every 
Territory  will  be  given  up  to  slavery.  There  will  not  be  one  inch  of  common  soil  left  to 
freedom. 

Congressional  interventionists  are  of  two  kinds.  They  differ  only  in  the  kind  of  inter¬ 
vention  they  demand,  but  not  in  the  principle.  The  Republican  party  is  composed  of  in¬ 
terventionists.  They  contend  that  it  is  the  bounden  duty  of  Congress  to  intervene  in  the 
affairs  of  a  Territory  to  prohibit  slavery.  The  Southern  interventionists  contend  that  it 
is  the  duty  of  Congress  to  intervene  to  protect  and  encourage  slavery  in  the  Territories. 
These  two  parties  agree  in  most  respects.  The}’  both  agree  that  it  is  the  duty  of  Congress 
to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  They  both  agree  that  Congress  should  legislate  on 
tbs  subject,  against  the  wishes  of  the  people  of  a  Territory. 

The  Republican  interventionists  contend  that  if  the  people  of  a  Territory  want  slavery , 
and  if  their  Legislature  passes  laws  to  establish  and  protect  slave  property,  that  it  is  the 
bounden  duty  of  Congress  to  intervene  and  abolish  slavery.  The  Southern  intervention- 
'  ists,  on  the  contrary,  contend  that  when  the  people  of  a  Territory  have  refused  to  have 
slavery ,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  Congress  to  intervene  to  protect  and  establish  slavery  in 
such  Territory.  They  thus,  both  alike,  legislate  against  the  will  of  the  people.  The  one 
party  would  have  Congress  make  all  our  Territories  free;  the  other  would  have  it  make 
them  all  slave.  Judge  Douglas,  on  the  contrary,  would  have  Congress  to  neither  interfere 
for  or  against  slavery;  but  “would  leave  the  people  of  the  Territory  perfectly  free  to 
form  and  regulate  their  own  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way.”  Judge  Douglas 
stands  by  the  principles  enunciated  in  the  compromise  resolutions  of  1850,  and  in  the  Kan- 
sas-Nebraska  act,  which  were  indorsed  and  approved  by  tlie  Cincinnati  convention  in 
1S56.  “This  is  the  head  and  front  of  his  offending,”  and  the  grounds  of  opposition  to  him. 

Mr.  CURRY.  I  did  not  advocate  an  act  of  Congress  “to  establish  slavery;”  nor  does 
any  other  Southern  man.  We  only  ask  Congress  to  pass  laws  to  protect  it  in  the  Territories. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  That  is  a  mere  play  on  words.  If  Congress  did  not  interfere 
the  Territorial  Legislature  might  drive  it  out,  and  it  would  not  exist;  but  where  Congress 
interferes  it  establishes  slavery — by  'protecting  it — for  if  it  were  not  for  protection  it  would 
cease  in  the  Territory.  I  look  to  the  effect,  and  not  to  the  claim  set  up.  We  must  call 
things  by  their  right  names.  And  an  act  to  protect  slavery  in  the  Territory  would  most 
effectually  establish  it.  For  protection  is  only  asked  where  the  people  are  hostile  to 
slavery,  and  where  it  would  not  be  allowed  to  remain  if  Congress  did  not  protect  it. 

What  is  the  issue  between  us?  The  gentleman  from  Alabama  contends  that  the  power 
to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery  was  not  given  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures^  by  either 
the  compromise  resolutions  of  1850,  or  bv  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  of  1854.  I,  on  the 
contrary,  contend  that  the  full  power  to  legislate  both  for  o.nd  against  slavery,  was  given 
to  the  Territorial  Legislatures  by  both  of  those  acts.  That  such  was  incontestably  the 
intention  at  the  time  those  acts  were  passed;  that  the  views  of  Judge  Douglas  on  that  sub¬ 
ject  were  fully,  clearly,  and  unequivocally  expressed  at  that  time ;  and  that  he  stands  now 
precisely  where  he  stood  then.  This  is  the  issue.  “Now  to  the  law  and  the  testimony.” 

•  The  slavery  question  had  been  permitted  to  sleep  from  the  date  of  the  Missouri  com¬ 
promise  until  after  Texas  was  annexed,  which  was  shortly  afterwards  followed  by  the  ac¬ 
quisition  of  Utah,  New  Mexico,  and  California.  A  party  then  sprung  up  in  the  North, 
which  was  led  by  Hon.  David  Wilmot,  of  Pennsylvania,  who  insisted  on  annexing  a  pro¬ 
viso  to  the  acquisition  of  all  these  Territories,  by  which  slavery  should  be  forever  excluded 
from  them.  This  celebrated  proviso  was  several  times  passed  in  the  lower  House  of  Con¬ 
gress,  but  was  defeated  in  the  Senate. 

Against  this  proviso  the  South  earnestly  protested;  and  every  expedient  which  the 
rules  of  legislation  permit  were  then  resorted  to  to  defeat  the  attempt  of  David  lYilmot 
and  his  party.  In  1848,  Judge  Douclas  moved  in  the  Senate  that  this  vexed  question 


3 


should  be  forever  settled  by  extending  the  Missouri  compromise  line  to  the  Pacific  oc^an. 
But  this  laudable  and  praiseworthy  effort  to  restore  peace  and  harmony  between  the  North 
and  the  South  was  defeated.  The  excitement  grew  alarming;  the  hearts  of  the  people, 
North  and  South,  were  alienated  from  each  other;  and  the  two  sections  were  arrayed  in 
open  hostility  on  this  alarming  question.  The  friends  of  the  Union  trembled  when  they 
thought  of  the  Consequences  that  might  ensue.  This  state  of  affairs  culminated  in  1850; 
and  the  good  and  great  men  of  all  parties  came  together  in  that  memorable  year  to  make 
some  safe  and  satisfactoi’y  adjustment  of  this  vexed  and  dangerous  question,  b}r  which  its 
discussion  might  be  forever  withdrawn  from  the  floor  of  Congress. 

The  great  and  glorious  Clay  had  gone  home  to  spend  the  evening  of  his  days  in  peace 
and  quiet  at  his  own  loved  Ashland  ;  but  he  heard  the  call  of  his  country  in  her  agony,  and 
he  came  back  to  the  Senate  Chamber  to  unite  his  voice  and  influence  with  Webster  and 
Cass,  and  Douglas  and  Benton,  and  a  host  of  other  “immortal  names  that  were  not  born 
to  die,”  to  secure  some  safe,  satisfactory,  and  permanent  adjustment  of  the  slavery  agita¬ 
tion.  The  result  of  their  counsels  was  the  celebrated  compromise  resolutions  of  that  year. 
And  I  now  propose  to  show  that,  by  those  resolutions,  the  full  power  to  legislate  not  only 
for,  but  against  slavery,  was  committed  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures ;  and  for  that  pur¬ 
pose  I  will  invite  the  attention  of  the  committee  to  some  of  the  various  amendments 
proposed  and  discussed  at  the  time.  Remember,  however,  that  I  am  now  attempting  to 
prove  that  the  intention  of  Congress  was  to  give  the  full  power  to  legislate  on  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  slavery  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures. 

The  bill  to  provide  temporary  government  for  Utah  and  New  Mexico  had  been  amended 
by  the  insertion  of  a  proviso  that  such  “Legislatures  should  pass  no  laws  to  interfere  with 
the  primary  disposal  of  the  title  to  the  soil,  nor  in  respect  to  African  slavery .”  Southern 
men  did  not  consider  this  clause  sufficiently  explicit;  and,  on  the  5th  of  June,  1850,  Mr. 
Berrien  moved  to  amend  the  bill  by  striking  out  “in  respect  to,”  and  inserting  “establish¬ 
ing  or  prohibiting;”  which  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  30  to  27.  (See  Senate  Journal,  p. 
376.)  The  bill,  as  it  there  stood,  clearly  prohibited  the  Territorial  Legislatures  from  leg¬ 
islating  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  Subsequently,  however,  a  different  view  of  the  subject 
prevailed  ;  and  it  was  resolved  to  give  the  full  power  of  legislation  to  the  Territorial 
Legislatures,  and  thereby  to  remove  forever  from  the  Halls  of  Congress  this  perplexing 
question.  On  the  31st  of  July,  1850,  Mr.  Norris,  of  New  Hampshire,  moved  to  amend  the 
bill,  line  ten,  section  six,  by  striking  out  the  words  “nor  establishing  or  prohibiting  Afri¬ 
can  slavery  ;”  which  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  32  to  20. 

Thus,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  restriction  which  was  intended  to  prevent  the  Territorial 
Legislatures  from  “establishing,”  as  well  as  prohibiting  slavery,  was  stricken  out  of  the 
bill.  Against  this  amendment,  the  southern  Senators  generally  voted.  It  had  been  a 
long  and  hard-fought  contest.  The  whole  subject  had  been  fully  examined  and  discussed 
during  its  progress.  Some  of  the  southern  Senators  had  been  most  reluctant  to  concede 
this  important  principle  in  regard  to  establishing  and  prohibiting  slavery;  but  they  1  ad 
to  yield  to  the  force  of  superior  numbers.  But  I  must  go  back  over  the  discussion  to 
show  that  the  subject  was  fully  discussed  and  clearly  understood. 

When  the  bill  came  up  for  action  on  the  15th  of  May,  Mr.  Davis,  of  Mississippi,  said : 

“I  offer  (lie  following  amendment:  to  strike  out,  in  the  sixth  line  of  the  tenth  section,  the  words  ‘in 
respect  to  African  slavery,’  and  insert  the  words  ‘  with  those  rights  of  property  growing  out  of  the  institu¬ 
tion  of  African  slavery  as  it  exists  in  any  of  the  States  of  the  Union.’  The  object  of  the  amendment  is  to 
prevent  the  Territorial  Legislature  from  legislating  against  the  rights  of  property  growing  out  of  the  insti¬ 
tution  of  slavery.  *  *  *  *  “  It  will  leave  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures  those  rights 

and  powers  which  are  essentially  necessary,  not  only  to  the  preservation  of  property,  but  to  the  peace  of 
the  Territory.  It  will  leave  the  right  to  make  such  police  regulations  as  are  necessary  to  prevent  disorder, 
and  which  will  be  absolutely  necessary  with  such  property  as  that  to  secure  its  beneficial  use  to  its  owner. 
With  this  brief  explanation,  I  submit  the  amendment.” 

Mr.  Clay,  in  reply  to  Mr.  Davis,  said : 

“If  the  object  of  the  Senator  is  to  provide  that  slaves  may  be  introduced  into  the  Territory  contrary  to 
the  lex  loci ,  and,  being  introduced,  nothing  shall  be  done  by  the  Legislature  to  impair  the  rights  of  owners 
to  hold  the  slaves  thus  brought  contrary  to  the  local  laws,  I  cerfainly  cannot  vote  for  it.  In  doing  so  1  shall 
repeat  again  the  expression  of  opinion  which  I  announced  at  an  early  period  of  the  session.” 

Here  we  find  the  line  distinctly  drawn  between  those  who  contended  for  the  right  to 
carry  slaves  into  the  Territories  and  hold  them  in  defiance  of  the  local  law,  and  those  who 
contended  that  such  right  was  subject  to  the  local  law  of  the  Territory. 

Pending  the  discussion  which  ensued,  Mr.  Davis,  at  the  suggestion  of  friends,  modified 
his  amendment  from  time  to  time,  until  it  assumed  the  following  shape : 

“  Nor  to  introduce  or  exclude  African  slavery  :  Provided,  That  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  con¬ 
strued  so  as  to  prevent  said  Territorial  Legislature  from  passing  such  laws  as  may  he  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  the  rights  of  property  of  every  kind  which  may  have  been,  or  may  be  hereafter,  conformably 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  Sfcutes,  held  in  or  introduced  into  said  Territory.” 

To  which,  on  the  same  day,  Mr.  Chase,  of  Ohio,  offered  the  following  amendment: 

“  Provided  further.  That  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  construed  as  authorizing  or  permitting  the 
introduction  of  slavery  or  the  holding  of  persons  as  property  within  said  Territory.” 

Mr.  LAMAR.  What  became  of  these  amendments  \ 


!  4 

Sir.  MONTGOMERY.  They  were  both  lost. 

Sir.  LASIAR.  I  thought  so. 

Sir.  MONTGOMERY.  Yes,  they  were  lost;  and  this  shows  that  Congress  gave  up  the 
whole  subject  of  legislation  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures. 

I  have  now  shown  incontestably  that,  by  the  clearest  language,  the  right  not  only  to 
establish,  but  to  prohibit  slavery,  was  conferred  on  the  Territorial  Legislatures  by  the  com¬ 
promise  measures  of  1850.  I  have  shown  it  by  the  language  of  the  act;  by  the  amend¬ 
ments  offered ;  and  also  from  the  lips  of  Clay  and  Davis.  But  I  will  not  slop  there.  I 
will  show,  further,  that  Judge  Douglas  then  maintained  precisely  the  same  doctrines  he 
maintains  now;  that  he  has  not  changed  in  the  slightest  particular.  Pending  these 
amendments  Judge  Douglas  said  : 

“  The  position  that  I  have  ever  taken  has  been,  that  this,  and  all  other  questions  relating  to  the  domestic 
affairs  and  domestic  policy  of  the  Territories,  ought  to  be  left  to  the  decision  of  the  people  themselves ; 
and  that  we  ought  to  be  content  with  whatever  way  they  may  decide  the  question,  because  they  have  a 
much  deeper  interes,  in  these  matters  than  we  have,  and  know  much  better  what  institutions  suit  them 
than  we,  who  have  never  been  there,  can  decide  for  them.  I  would,  therefore,  have  much  preferred  that 
that  portion  of  the  bill  should  have  remained  as  it  was  reported  from  the  Committee  on  Territories,  with 
no  provision  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  the  one  way  or  the  other.  And  I  do  hope  yet  that  that  clause  will 
be  stricken  out.  I  am  satisfied,  sir,  that  it  gives  no  strength  to  the  bill.  I  am  satisfied,  even  if  it  did  give 
strength  to  it,  that  it  ought  not  to  be  there,  because  it  is  a  violation  of  principle — a  violation  of  that  prin¬ 
ciple  upon  which  we  have  all  rested  our  defence  of  the  course  we  have  taken  on  this  question.  I  do  not 
see  how  those  of  us  who  have  taken  the  position  we  have  taken — of  non-intei  .ention — and  have  argued 
in  favor  of  the  right  of  the  people  to  legislate  for  themselves  on  this  question,  can  support  such  a  provision 
without  abandoning  all  the  arguments  which  we  used  in  the  presidential  campaign  in  the  year  1843,  and 
the  principles  set  forth  by  the  honorable  Senator  from  Michigan,  (Mr.  Cass)  in  that  letter  which  is  known 
as  the  “  Nicholson  Letter.”  We  are  required  to  abandon  that  platform  ;  we  are  required  to  abandon  those 
principles,  and  to  stultify  ourselves,  and  to  adopt  the  opposite  doctrine — and  for  what?  In  order  to  say 
that  the  people  of  the  Territories  shall  not  have  such  institutions  as  they  shall  deem  adapted  to  their  con¬ 
dition  and  their  wants.  I  do  not  see,  sir,  bow  such  a  provision  can  be  acceptable  either  to  the  people  of 
the  North  or  the  South.” 

Upon  the  question,  bow  many  inhabitants  a  Territory  should  contain  before  it  should 
be  formed  into  a  political  community  with  the  rights  of  self-government,  Mr.  Douglas 
said : 

“  The  Senator  from  Mississippi  puts  the  question  to  me  as  to  what  number  of  people  there  must  be  in  a 
Territory  before  this  right  to  govern  themselves  accrues.  Without  determining  the  precise  number,  I  will 
assume  that  the  right  ought  to  accrue  to  the  people  at  the  moment  they  haveLnough  to  constitute  a  gov¬ 
ernment;  and,  sir,  the  bill  assumes  that  there  are  people  enough  there  to  require  a  government,  and 
enough  to  authorize  the  people  to  govern  themselves.”  *  *  *  “  Your  bill  concedes  that  a  representa¬ 
tive  government  is  necessary — a  government  founded  upon  the  principles  of  popular  sovereignty  and  the 
right  of  a  people  to  enact  their  own  laws;  and  for  this  reason  you  give  them  a  Legislature  composed  of 
two  branches,  like  the  Legislatures  of  the  different  States  and  Territories  of  the  Union.  You  confer  upon 
them  the  right  to  legislate  on  ‘  all  rightful  subjects  of  legislation,’  except  negroes.  Why  except  negroes? 
Why  except  African  slavery?  If  the  inhabitants  are  competent  to  govern  themselves  upon  all  other  sub¬ 
jects,  and  in  reference  to  all  other  descriptions  of  property;  if  they  are  competent  to  make  laws  and  deter¬ 
mine  the  relations  between  husband  and  wife,  and  parent  and  child,  and  municipal  laws  effecting  the  rights 
and  property  of  citizens  generally,  they  are  competent  also  to  make  laws  to  govern  themselves  in  relation 
to  slavery  and  negroes.” 

With  reference  to  the  protection  of  property  in  slaves,  Mr.  Douglas  said; 

“I  have  a  word  to  say  to  the  honorable  Senator  from  Mississippi,  (Mr.  Davis.)  lie  insists  that  I  am 
not  in  favor  of  protecting  properly,  and  that  his  amendment  is  offered  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  pro¬ 
perty  under  the  Constitution.  Now,  sir,  I  ask  you  what  authority  he  has  for  assuming  that?  Do  I  not  de¬ 
sire  to  protect  property  because  I  wish  to  allow  the  people  to  pass  such  laws  as  they  deem  proper  respect¬ 
ing  their  rights  to  property  without  any  exception  ?  lie  might  just  as  well  say  that  I  am  opposed  to  pro¬ 
tecting  property  in  merchandise,  in  steamboats,  in  cattle,  in  real  estate,  as  to  say  that  I  am  opposed  to  pro¬ 
tecting  property  of  any  othvr  description ;  tor  I  desire  to  put  them  all  on  an  equality,  and  allow  the  peo¬ 
ple  to  make  their  own  laws  in  respect  to  the  whole  of  them.” 

If  these  extracts  are  not  sufficient,  I  will  produce  others.  I  can  show  that  at  least  six 
times  in  that  discussion  Judge  Douglas  reiterated  these  same  sentiments.  The  gentleman 
from  Alabama  has  sneeringly  called  Judge  Douglas’s  position  “  a  new  dogma,”  It  is  at 
least  ten  years  old.  And  it  is  as  old  as  the  acts  of  Congress  which  first  conferred  the 
power  of  legislation  on  the  Territorial  Legislatures.  It  began  then,  and  has  been  con¬ 
sistently  maintained  by  him  ever  since.  I  defy  any  man  to  show  that  he  has  ever  wavered 
or  faltered  in  its  support,  or  that  there  is  the  slightest  contradiction  in  his  sentiments. 

In  1852,  after  the  passage  of  the  compromise  resolutions,  the  Democratic  national  con¬ 
vention  assembled  at  Baltimore  and  heartly  and  cheerfully  indorsed  the  whole  series  of 
compromise  measures.  The  Whig  national  convention  did  the  same.  We  went  into  the 
contest,  and  elected  Pierce  and  Kmg  on  that  very  platform.  We  were  all  committed  to 
it  then;  and  we  stand  committed  to  it  now. 

In  1854  the  principle  of  non-intervention,  as  declared  by  the  compromise  resolutions, 
was  extended  by  the  acts  to  organize  territorial  governments  for  Kansas  and  Nebraska. 
Let  southern  gentlemen  reflect,  before  they  ask  us  to  abandon  this  important  principle, 
what  sacrifices  the  North  made  to  procure  its  adoption.  By  the  Missouri  compromise* 
the  South  had  relinquished  all  right  to  carry  slave  property  into  either  Kansas  or  Ne¬ 
braska.  Both  these  Territories,  by  that  agreement,  were  to  be  forever  free. 

You  will  tell  me  that  the  compromise  was  unconstitutional.  Be  it  so.  Yet  it  was  a 
compromise,  and  even  Mr.  Calhoun  had  avowed  his  willingness  to  carry  it  out.  It  was  a 


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compromise,  and  you  had  received  Missouri  and  Arkansas  as  your  share  of  it.  We  had 
not  got  ours.  But  when  we  could  not  extend  that  compromise  line  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
and  when  we  saw  and  felt  the  dreadful  and  dangerous  influences  of  sectional  slavery  agi¬ 
tation,  we  gave  up  these  Territories  to  secure  the  adoption  of  the  important  principle  of 
non-intervention  by  Congress  in  favor  or  against,  slavery  in  the  Territories.  We  did  it 
because  we  believed  it  right.  We  did  it  because  the  best  interest  of  the  nation  demanded 
that  the  slavery  agitation  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  Halls  of  Congress.  We  did  it 
to  restore  peace  and  harmony  to  a  distracted  country.  Yet  now  our  generosity  and  sac¬ 
rifices  are  forgotten  by  a  little  body  of  men  in  the  South  who  claim  that  it  shall  be  made 
slave  territory  so  long  as  it  remains  in  a  territorial  condition.  “This  is  not  in  the  bond.” 
We  will  not  consent  to  it.  We  will  carry  out  the  compromise  and  the  principle  as  wc 
made  them;  and  the  little  band  of  ten  or  fifteen  interventionists  at  the  South  can  neither 
drive  nor  frighten  us  from  our  position.  We  act  in  good  faith  in  support  of  these  estab¬ 
lished  principles,  and  we  ask  the  same  in  return. 

I  will  now  proceed  to  show  that  the  doctrine  of  non-intervention ,  as  advocated  by 
Judge  Douglas  in  1S50,  was  extended  and  incorporated  in  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  of 
1854.  The  committee,  by  whom  that  bill  was  imported  to  the  Senate,  in  their  report,  say  ; 

“The  principal  amendments  which  your  committee  deem  it  their  duty  to  commend  to  the  favorable  ac¬ 
tion  of  the  Senate,  in  a  special  report,  are  those  in  which  the  principles  established  by  the*  compromise 
measnres  of  1S50,  so  far  as  they  are  applicable  to  territorial  organizations,  are  proposed  to  be  affirmed  and 
carried  into  practical  operation  within  the  limits  of  the  new  Territory.  The  wisdom  of  those  measures  is 
attested,  not  less  by  their  salutary  and  beneficial  effects  in  allaying  sectional  agitation  and  restoring 
peace  and  harmony  to  an  irritated  and  distracted  people ,  than  by  the  cordial  and  almost  universal 
approbation  with  which  they  have  been  received  and  sanctioned  by  the  whole  country. 

“In  the  judgment  of  your  committee,  those  measures  were  intended  to  have  a  far  more  comprehensive 
and  enduring  effect  than  the  mere  adjustment  of  the  difficulties  arising  out  of  the  recent  acquisition  of 
Mexican  territory.  They  were  designed  to  establish  certain  great  principles,  which  would  not  only  fur¬ 
nish  adequate  remedies  for  existing  evils,  but ,  in  all  time  to  come ,  avoid  the  perils  of  a  similar  agitation, 
by  withdrawing  the  question  of  slavery  from  the  Halls  of  Congress  a/nd  the  political  arena,  and  com¬ 
mitting  it  to  the  arbitrament  of  those  who  were  immediately  interested  in  and  alone  responsible  for  its 
consequences.  With  a  view  of  conforming  their  action  to  the  settled  policy  of  the  Government,  sanctioned 
by  the  approving  voice  of  the  American  people,  your  commiitee  have  deemed  it  their  duty  to  incorporate 
and  perpetuate,  in  their  territorial  bill,  the  principles  and  spirit  of  those  measures.” 

Here  we  have  the  intention  clearly  avowed  by  the  committee  that  they  intend,  by  the 
bill  they  have  reported,  “in  all  time  to  come,  to  avoid  the  perils  of  a  similar  agitation, 
(that  of  1850,)  by  withdrawing  the  question  of  slavery  from  the  Halls  of  Congress  and  the 
political  arena,  and  committing  it  to  the  arbitrament  of  those  who  ivere  immediately  inte¬ 
rested,  and  alone  responsible  for  its  consequences Nor  is  this  all;  for  Judge  Douglas,  as 
,  if  to  remove  all  doubt  on  the  subject,  and  to  place  the  question  beyond  the  possibility  of 
controversy  or  cavil,  moved  the  following  amendment  to  the  bill: 

“  That  the  Constitution,  and  all  laws  of  the  United  States  which  are  not  locally  inapplicable,  shall  have 
the  same  foTce  and  effect  within  the  Territory  as  elsewhere  within  the  United  States,  except  the  eighth 
section  of  the  act  preparatory  to  the  admission  of  Missouri  into  the  Union,  approved  March  6, 1S20,  which, 
being  inconsistent  with  the  principle  of  non-intervention  by  Congress  with  slavery  in  the  States  and  Ter¬ 
ritories,  as  recognized  by  the  legislation  of  1850,  commonly  called  the  ‘compromise  measures,’  is  hereby 
declared  inoperative  and  void — it  being  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  this  act  not  to  legislate  slavery 
into  any  Territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it  therefrom,  but  to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free  to 
form  and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.”  '  • 

This  amendment  was  adopted;  and  it  should  forever  silence  those  who  contend  that  it 
was  not  the  intention  of  the  Kansas- Nebraska  act  to  commit  the  whole  subject  of  slavery 
legislation  in  the  Territories  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures.  Look  at  tlie  language,  and 
see  how  convincingly  clear  it  is:  “It  being  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  this  act  not  to 
legislate  slavery  into  any  State  or  Territory.”  The  word  is  legislate.  No  such  miserable 
language  as  that  when  the  people  come  to  adopt  a  constitution.  Nothing  of  the  kind. 
“  That  is  a  new  dogma;"  the  contemptible  subterfuge  of  wily,  designing,  ambitious  politi¬ 
cians,  aspiring  to  the  Presidency,  and  making  bids  for  southern  votes.  Congress  was 
speaking  of  not  legislating  slavery  into  or  out  of  a  Territory  ;  and  they  used  the  word 
which  conveyed  their  intention.  Congress  would  not  legislate  for  or  against  slavery  ;  but 
they  would  leave  the  people  of  the  Territory  perfectly  free  to  legislate  for  themselves  in 
relation  to  their  own  domestic  institutions,  slavery  included. 

Mr.  CRAWFORD.  As  the  gentleman  seems  to  be  discussing  this  subject  in  a  spirit  of 
fairness  and  candor,  I  desire  just  at  this  point  to  submit  iny  understanding  of  the  power 
given  by  the  Kansas  act  to  the  people  of  the  Territory,  so  that  he  may  answer  it.  When 
the  bill  first  came  from  the  Territorial  Committee,  the  words  used  were,  that  they  might 
“form  and  regulate  their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way;”  and  under  that  clause 
it  was  insisted  by  some  that  the  Legislature  had  the  constitutional  power  to  exclude  sla¬ 
very  from  the  Territory  ;#by  others,  that  they  had  no  such  power  ;  and  as  there  existed 
this  difference  of  opinion  touching  the  right  under  the  Constitution,  and  all  sides  being 
willing  to  be  governed  by  that  instrument,  it  was  agreed  to  insert  the  words,  “subject 
to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.”  Now,  since  the  passage  of  that  act,  our  con¬ 
stitutional  rights  have  been  defined  by  the  Supreme  Court ;  and  being  ascertained,  we 


6 


hold  that  they  ought  to  be  recognized  and  observed.  It  is  very  clear  that  if  they  had 
then  been  known,  the  words  “subject  to  the  Constitution”  need  not  to  have  been  incor¬ 
porated  in  the  bill ;  but  no  w  that  they  are  settled  by  the  decision  in  the  Dred  Scott  case, 
we  think  it  strange  that  this  difference  between  our  statesmen  should  still  exist,  and  that 
it  should  be  insisted  upon  that  the  Territorial  Legislature  has  a  power  which  is  unequivo¬ 
cally  denied.  All  we  ask  or  want  are  our  constitutional  rights. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  It  is  true,  as  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Georgia  says,  the 
words  “subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States”  were  inserted  because,  du¬ 
ring  the  debate,  it  was  contended  by  some  southern  statesmen  that,  under  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States,  slavery  could  not  be  abolished  by  the  Territorial  Legislatures.  And 
it  is  also  true  that  another  section  of  the  Kansas  and  Nebraska  act  gives  a  right  of  appeal 
to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  in  all  cases  involving  questions  of  personal 
freedom  of  slaves.  But  all  this  incontestably  shows  just  what  I  contend  for — that  Con¬ 
gress  intended,  when  these  acts  were  passed,  to  give  the  whole  power  of  legislation  on 
the  subject  of  slavery  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures,  “subject  only  to  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States.” 

But  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Georgia  (Mr.  Crawford)  contends  that  the  Supreme 
Court  has  decided,  in  the  Dred  Scott  case,'  that  a  Territorial  Legislature  has  not  the  power 
to  abolish  slavery.  With  all  respect  to  the  honorable  gentleman,  I  deny  it.  No  such 
question  arose  in  the  Dred  Scott  case  ;  and  it  could  not  be  decided.  But  1  deny  that  the 
court  ever  gave  a  dictum  in  that  case  which  would  show  that  they  held  any  such  opinion. 
The  Supreme  Court  never  have  so  decided,  and  I  tl(ink  they  never  can  so  decide. 

But  if  1  were  to  admit  that  the  Supreme  Court  had  so  decided,  it  would  only  show 
how  uncalled  for  the  speech  of  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  was  against  Judge 
Douglas.  If  this  question  has  been  settled  and  determined,  what  difference  what  the 
views  of  Judge  Douglas  may  be?  He  cannot  change  it,  nor  reverse  it. 

Mr.  LAMAR.  I  will  tell  "the  gentleman  why  we  need  to  speak  upon  this  question.  It 
is  because  Judge  Douglas  has  said  that  no  matter  what  the  court  may  say,  the  right  of 
the  people  to  exclude  the  institution  of  slavery  vas  perfect  and  complete.  That  is  what 
we  complain  of;  that  after  he  had  pledged  himself  here  that  he  would  abide  the  decision 
of  the  court,  upon  the  hustings  of  Illinois  he  declared  that  no  matter  what  the  court 
might  decide,  the  right  of  the  people  is  perfect  and  complete,  by  unfriendly  legislation, 
to  exclude  the  institution. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  assure  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Mississippi  he  is  entirely 
mistaken  ;  Judge  Douglas  never  made  any  such  statement.  Judge  Douglas  has  consis¬ 
tently  and  uniformly  said  that  he  would  submit  to  and  faithfully  carry  out  the  decision 
of  the  Supreme  Court — not  only  on  that  subject,  but  on  all  others.  He  is  far  too  true  a 
patriot  and  too  good  a  citizen  to  utter  any  such  sentiment.  I  will  read  the  gentleman 
what  Judge  Douglas  has  said,  and  now  says,  on  that  subject.  In  his  rejoinder  to  Judge 
Black,  he  says,  on  page  6: 

“  "Whenever  a  case  shall  arise  under  those  or  any  other  territorial  enactments,  affectina:  slave  property 
or  personal  freedom  in  the  Territories,  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  shall  decide  the  ques¬ 
tion,  I  shall  feel  myself  hound  to  respect  and  obey  the  decision ,  and  assist  in  carrying  it  into  ef'ect  in 
yood faith  ” 

That  is  his  pledge  ;  and  my  word  for  it,  he  will  carry  it  out.  He  never  yet  has  broken 
his  plighted  word,  and  he  never  will. 

Mr.  LAMAR.  That  is  from  his  article,  but  in  a  speech  in  Illinois  he  said  the  right  of 
the  people  was  perfect  and.complete,  no  matter  what  the  coitrt  decided. 

Mr.  ROBINSON,  of  Illinois.  What  speech  ? 

Mr.  LAMAR.  In  his  Freeport  speech.  He  pledged  himself  in  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  to  abide  by  judicial  decision  ;  but  when  he  went  before  the  Free-soilers  of  Illinois, 
he  told  them  that  the  right  of  a  Territory  was  perfect  and  complete. 

Mr.  HINDMAN  sought  the  floor. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  must  decline  positively  to  yield  further— not  from  any  dis¬ 
courtesy’  to  the  gentleman,  but  because  I  have  not  time.  If  the  committee  will  extend 
the  time,  I  am  ready  to  discuss  the  matter  for  a  week,  if  gentlemen  wish  it. 

Now,  sir,  without  any  discourtesy  to  the  gentleman  from  Mississippi,  there  is  a  dif¬ 
ference  of  opinion  between  us.  1  say  he  can  produce  no  such  speech  made  byr  Judge 
Douglas,  which  was  ever  published  by  the  Democratic  party.  It  may  be  that  some  per¬ 
son  has  published  a  speech,  in  which  such  language  has  been  put  in  Judge  Douglas’s 
mouth  ;  but  I  assure  the  gentleman,  Judge  Douglas  never  uttered  sucli  a  sentiment  in  his 
life.  He  stands  upon  the  decision  of  the  Supreme  Court;  and  I  say  that  the  Supreme 
Court  never  did,  and  I  believe  they  never  will,  decide  any  such  doctrine  as  that  for  which 
the  gentleman  from  Alabama,  and  those  who  agree  with  him,  contend. 

I  have  been  drawn  from  my  line  of  argument  byr  the  repeated  interruptions  with 
which  I  have  been  assailed,  and  I  must  go  back  and  take  up  the  thread  of  my  discourse 
where  I  left  off.  1  have  now  shown  that  the  principle  of  non-intervention  adopted  by 
the  compromise  resolutions  of  1S50  was  embodied,  enlarged,  and  extended  byT  the  Kansas- 


k 


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Nebraska  act.  I  have  shown  that  Judge  Douglas  then  declared  his  intention  to  give  the 
power  of  legislation  on  this  subject  of  slavery  to  the  Territorial  Legislatures  alone;  that 
Congress  gave  up  all  right  over  the  subject;  and  that  this  amendment  was  supported  by 
almost  a  united  South,  and  especially  by  the  Representatives  from  Alabama.  Before  I 
leave  that  subject  I  propose  to  discuss  a  clause  in  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill.  The  lan¬ 
guage:  is  that  the  “Territorial  Legislature  shall  have  legislative  ‘power  over  all  rightfu.1 
subjects  of  legislation ,  subject  only  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States.”  The  Terri¬ 
torial  Legislatures  had  power  to  legislate  then  “  on  all  rightful  subjects  of  legislation." 
Has  slavery  not  been  deemed  a  rightful  subject  of  legislation?  Was  it  ever  denied  that 
a  legislative  bod}7  could  either  establish  or  abolish  slavery?  I  think  not.  If  slavery  is 
not  a  “rightful  subject  of  legislation,”  then  all  our  acts  abolishing  slavery  are  void,  and 
slavery  still  exists  in  all  the  northern  States.  And  if  slavery  is  a  rightful  subject  of  leg¬ 
islation,  then,  incontestably,  it  was  the  intention  of  Congress  to  give  the  power  not  only 
to  establish,  but  to  abolish  slavery  in  the  Territories.  Will  any  man  contend,that  south¬ 
ern  Representatives,  when  thqy  voted  for  that  bill,  did  not  know  that  slavery  was  always 
admitted  to  be  “a  rightful  subject  of  legislation?”  I  think  no  one  would  stultify  himself 
by  denying  it.  If,  then,  this  was  known,  it  can  admit  of  no  contest,  that  it  was  the  in¬ 
tention  of  Congress  to  give  the  full  and  entire  power  over  the  subject  of  slavery  to  the 
Territorial  Legislatures.  Nor  does  the  proof  cease  here.  In  1856,  the  great  Democratic 
national  convention  which  assembled  at  Cincinnati  indorsed  and  approved  this  doctrine 
of  non  intervention  in  language  so  clear  and  unequivocal  that  it  leaves  no  possibility-  of 
doubt  on  the  subject.  .The  resolution  is  as  follows: 

“  The  American  Democracy  recognized  and  adopted  principles  contained  in  the  organic  laws  establish¬ 
ing  the  Territories  of  Kansas  and  [Nebraska  as  embodying  the  only  sound  and  safe  solution  of  the  ‘slavery 
question,’  upon  which  the  great  national  idea  of  the  people  of  this  whole  country  can  repose  in  its  deter¬ 
mined  conservatism  of  the  Union — non- interference  by  Congress  with  slavery  in  State  and  Territory ,  o-r 
in  the  District  of  Oohtmbia.  ’ 

“  That  this  was  the  basis  of  the  compromise  of  1850,  confirmed  by  both  the  Democratic  and  Whig  parties 
in  national  conventions— ratified  by  the  people  in  the  election  of  1852 — and  rightly  applied  to  the  organi¬ 
zation  of  the  Territories  in  1854;  that  by  the  uniform  application  of  this  Democratic  principle  to  the  organ¬ 
ization  of  Territories,  and  to  the  admission  of  new  States,  with  or  without  domestic  slavery  as  they  may 
elect,  the  equal  rights  of  all  will  be  preserved  intact— the  original  compacts  of  the  constitution  maintained 
inviolate — and  the  perpetuity  and  expansion  of  this  Union  insured  to  its  utmost  capacity  of  embracing  in 
peace  and  harmony  any  future  American  State  that  may  be  constituted  or  annexed  with  a  republican  form 
of  government  ” 

To  that  resolution  the  whole  Democratic  party  was  bound,  North  and  South.  Yvr e  in 
Pennsylvania  stood  pledged  to  it;  you  in  Alabama  and  Georgia  and  Mississippi  were 
pledged  to  it.  We  in  Pennsylvania,  a  few  days  since,  declared  our  “unalterable  devo¬ 
tion  to,  and  faith  in,”  that  platform.  Why  cannot  Alabama  do  the  same?  Who  has 
changed?  Certainly  we  have  not;  we  stand  now  -where  we  stood  then.  I  leave  the 
gentleman  from  Alabama  to  solve  that  question. 

But  I  am  unwilling  to  permit  this  subject  to  pass  from  rue  until  I  show  that  southern 
members  have  not  only  been  committed  to  this  doctrine  of  non-intervention;  by  the  ac¬ 
tion  of  national  conventions,  and  by  their  votes  for  Pierce  and  King,  and  Buchanan  and 
Breckinridge;  but  I  will  go  further,  and  show  that  they  have  been  committed  to  it  by 
their  votes  for  officers  of  Congress  for  years  past.  On  the  12th  day  of  January,  1856,  a 
contest  was  going  on  in  this  House  for  the  election  of  Speaker.  Mr.  Richardson  and  Mr. 
Banks  were  the  rival  candidates.  On  that  day,  Mr.  Bingham,  of  Ohio,  propounded  cer¬ 
tain  interrogatories  to  Mr.  Richardson.  The  third  interrogatory  was  as  follows : 

“  Am  I  right  in  supposing  that  his  theory  is,  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  does  not  carry 
slavery  to,  and  protect  it  in,  the  Territories  of  the  United  States?  That  in  the  territory  acquired  from 
Mexico  and  France  (including  Kansas  and  Nebraska)  the  Missouri  restriction  was  necessary  to  make  the 
territory  free,  because  slavery  existed  there  under  France  at  the  time  of  the  acquisition ;  but  that  the  Kan¬ 
sas  and  Nebraska  bill,  which  repeals  that  restriction,  but  neither  legislates  slavery  into  those  Territories 
nor  excludes  it  therefrom,  in  liis  opinion,  leaves  those  Territories  without  either  local  or  constitutional  Jaw 
protecting  slavery  ;  and  that  therefore  the  Kansas  and  Nebraska  bill  promotes  the  formation  of  slave  States 
in  Kansas  and  Nebraska.” 

To  which  Mr.  Richardson  responded  as  follows: 

“  The  Constitution  does  not,  in  my  opinion,  carry  the  institutions  of  any  of  the  States  into  the  Territories ; 
but  it  affords  the  same  protection  there  to  the  institutions  of  one  State  as  of  another.  The  citizen  of  Vir¬ 
ginia  is  as  much  entitled,  in  the  common  territory,  to  the  protection  of  his  property,  under  the  Constitution, 
as  the  citizen  of  Illinois;  but  both  are  dependent  upon  the  legislation  of  the  territorial  government  lor 
laws  to  protect  their  property,  of  whatever  kind  it  may  be.  Thus,  it  will  be  seen,  that  though  there  may 
be  upon  this  point  a  difference  theoretically — involving  questions  for  judicial  decision — yet  there  is  none, 
praciically,  among  the  friends  of  non-intervention  by  Congress,  as  the  practical  result  is  to  place  the  deci¬ 
sion  of  the  questions  in  the  hands  of  those  who  are  most  deeply  interested  in  its  solution,  namely:  the 
people  of  the  Territory,  who  have  made  it  their  home,  and  whose  interests  are  the  most  deeply  involved 
in  the  character  of  the  institutions  under  which  they  are  to  live.” 

There  now  is  popular  sovereignty  for  you — broad,  clear,  and  unequivocal.  Yet  after 
he  gave  this  answer,  the  entire  Democratic  delegation  from  Alabama,  and  1  believe  from 
the  South  generally,  voted,  and  continued  to  vote  for  Mr.  Richardson.  Popular  sover¬ 
eignty  was  not  then  considered  a  “  new  dogma"  Southern  men  were  not  alarmed  at  these 
doctrines,  as  they  feign  to  be  now. 


8 


Mr.  BARKSDALE.  I  was  a  member  of  that  Congress,  and  voted  for  Mr.  Richardson, 
of  Illinois,  for  Speaker,  after  he  avowed  these  sentiments;  and  I  would  like  the  gentle¬ 
man  to  tell  whether  he  is  to  be  understood  as  saying  that,  by  voting  for  Mr.  Richardson,  I 
indorsed  these  sentiments? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  have  stated  these  facts,  and  I  have  drawn  my  inferences. 
The  gentleman  has  heard  them.  If  the  avowal  of  the  popular  sovereignty  doctrines  by 
Mr.  Richardson  then  was  not  sufficient  grounds  for  him  to  oppose  Mr.  Richardson  for 
Speaker,  I  cannot  see  how  the  avowal  of  the  same  doctrines  by  Mr.  Douglas  will  consti¬ 
tute  good  grounds  for  the  honorable  gentleman  to  oppose  Judge  Douglas  now. 

Mr.  BARKSDALE.  The  gentleman  himself  has  this  session  voted  for  Mr.  Bocock  for 
Speaker,  who  repudiates  squatter  sovereignty,  or,  as  the  gentleman  calls  the  doctrine, 
popular  sovereignty.  He  voted  for  Mr.  Bocock,  who  holds  that  it  is  the  duty  of  all  the 
departments  of  the  Government,  Executive,  legislative,  and  judicial,  to  protect  slave 
property  in  the  Territories,  whenever  it  may  be  necessary  to  do  so.  When  you  voted 
for  him,  did  you  indorse  those  sentiments? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  Mr.  Bocock  never  expressed  these  sentiments,  that  I  am  aware 
of.  I  never  heard  them  expressed  by  him,  and  the  gentleman  from  Mississippi,  therefore, 
must  be  speaking  upon  private  information,  which  nobody  else  has. 

Mr.  BARKSDALE.  At  any  event,  Mr.  Bocock  denies  to  a  Territorial  Legislature  the 
power  to  legislate  against  slavery. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  Mr.  Bocock  is  present,  and  can  speak  for  himself.  I  deny  the 
right  of  the  gentleman  from  Mississippi  to  speak  for  him.  He  cannot  say  that  before  I 
voted  for  him  for  Speaker  he  expressed  the  sentiments  attributed  to  him  by  the  gentle¬ 
man  from  Mississippi. 

Mr.  McQUEEN.  By  permission  of  the  gentleman  from  Pennsylvania,  I  desire  to  say 
that  I  was  in  the  galleiy,  and  heard  the  gentleman  read  some  interrogatories  which  were 
propounded  to  Mr.  Richardson,  in  the  contest  between  him  and  Mr.  Banks,  for  the  Speak¬ 
ership,  in  1856,  by  some  gentleman  on  the  other  side  of  the  House,  and  Mr.  Richardson’s 
answer:  “and  that  every  southern  Representative  on  the  floor  of  the  House  voted  for 
him  after  that  answer.”  Now,  I  recollect  very  well  that  interrogatories  were  propounded 
to  Mr.  Richardson  in  that  contest;  and  upon  his  answer  I  cast  off  from  him,  and  did  so 
for  three  days,  until  Mr.  Richardson  drew  his  bow  again,  and  explained  it  away,  when  I 
again  cast  my  vote  for  him. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  am  glad  my  friend  from  South  Carolina  has 
made  the  correction  ;  for  I  would  very  much  regret  to  do  him  injustice.  I  will  make  the 
gentleman  from  South  Carolina  an  exception.  But  I  think  it  makes  my  position  stronger, 
for  it  shows  that  the  language  was  well  understood  and  considered  at  the  time,  and  was 
not  thought  objectionable  to  any  other  southern  Representative  than  the  honorable  gen¬ 
tleman  from  South  Carolina. 

Mr.  HINDMAN.  I  would  like  to  put  a  question  to  the  gentleman. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  The  House  must  acknowledge  that  I  have  been  very  liberal.  I 
have  been  interrupted  at  every  step  of  my  argument  by  questions.  When  the  gentleman 
from  Alabama  was  upon  the  floor,  those  of  us  who  differed  from  him  kept  our  seats  and 
allowed  him  to  go  on  without  interruption.  I  must  decline  to  yield  further.  I  have  not 
the  time  to  spare.  (Cries  from  the  Democratic  benches  of  “That’s  right!”  “Go  on!  ” 
and  “We  will  give  you  more  time!  ”) 

Mr.  BURNETT.  I  want  to  say  this:  I  hope  the  gentleman  will  be  allowed  to  proceed 
without  further  interruption.  I  must  object,  however,  to  any  extension  of  his  time  be¬ 
yond  that  which  was  taken  from  him  by  interruptions. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  am  obliged  to  the  House  for  its  courtesy  and  kindness.  And 
I  will  now  proceed. 

But  I  am  not  done  with  this  matter  yet.  I  cannot  let  the  honorable  gentleman  from 
Alabama  escape  so  easily.  I  now  desire  to  show  that  he,  bv  his  vote,  has  virtually  in¬ 
dorsed  and  approved  the  doctrine  of  unfriendly  legislation ,  about  which  so  much  has  been 
said  in  the  public  prints  recently.  The  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  came  into 
Congress  when  I  did.  At  the  first  session  of  the  last  Congress  Colonel  Orr,  of  South  Car¬ 
olina,  was  a  candidate  for  the  office  of  Speaker  of  this  House.  I  will  now  invite  the  at¬ 
tention  of  this  House,  and  the  honorable  gentleman,  to  the  views  of  Colonel  Orr  on  the 
subject  of  “  unfriendly  legislation .”  On  the  11th  day  of  December,  1856,  Colonel  Orr 
said,  in  reply  to  Hon.  Humphrey  Marshall,  of  Kentucky: 

“I  sav,  although  I  deny  that  squatter  sovereignty  exists  in  the  Territories  of  Kansas  and  Nebraska  by 
virtue  of  thi3  bill,  it  is  a  matter  practically  of  little  consequence  whether  it  does  or  not;  and  I  think  I  shall 
he  able  to  satisfy  the  gentleman  of  that.  *  The  gentleman  knows  that,  in  every  slaveholding  community  of 
this  Union,  we  have  local  legislation  and  localpolice  regulations  appertaining  to  that  institution,  without 
which  the  institution  Avonld  not  only  be  valueless,  but  a  curse  to  the  community.  Without  them  the  slave¬ 
holder  could  not  enforce  his  rights  when  invaded  by  others ;  and  if  you  had  no  local  legislation  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  giving  protection,  the  institution  would  be  of  no  value.  I  can  appeal  to  every  gentleman  upon  this 
floor  who  represents  a  slaveholding  constituency,  to  attest  the  truth  of  what  I  have  stated  upon  that  point. 

“Now,  the  legislative  authority  of  a  Territory  is  invested  with  a  discretion  to  vote  for  or  against  laws. 
We  think  they  ought  to  pass  laws  in  every  Territory,  when  the  Territory  is  open  to  settlement,  and  slave- 


9 


holders  go  there,  to  protect  slave  property.  But  if  they  decline  to  pass  such  laws,  what  is  the  remedy? 
None,  sir.  If  the  majority  of  the  people  are  opposed  to  the  institution,  and  if  they  do  not  desire  it  ingraft¬ 
ed  upon  their  Territory,  all  they  have  to  do  is  simply  to  decline  to  pass  laws  in  the  Territorial  Legislature 
for  its  protection,  and  then  it  is  as  well  excluded  as  if  the  power  was  invested  in  the  Territorial  Legislature, 
and  exercised  by  them,  to  prohibit  it.  Now,  I  ask  the  gentleman,  what  is  the  practical  importance  to  re¬ 
sult  from  the  agitation  and  discussion  of  this  question  as  to  whether  squatter  sovereignty  does,  or  does  not, 
exist?  Practically  it  is  a  matter  of  little  moment.” 

There,  now,  is  the  doctrine  of  “ unfriendly  legislation  ”  which  the  gentleman  from  Ala¬ 
bama  so  religiously  detests  in  Judge  Douglas.  Yet,  notwithstanding  this  open  avowal  of 
opinion,  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  not  only  voted  for  the  election  of  Colo¬ 
nel  Orr  for  Speaker,  but  lie  voted  for  him  in  caucus  as  his  first  choice  as  candidate  for 
that  office.  That  was  a  little  better  than  two  years  since.  Yet,  at  this  session,  the  hon¬ 
orable  gentleman  utterly  refused  to  vote  for  Colonel  McClernand,  because  he  held  pre¬ 
cisely  the  opinions  avowed  by  Colonel  Orr.  Why  was  this?  Who  has  changed  ?  The 
Democratic  party  voted  for  Colonel  Orr  then,  and  elected  him.  The  mass  of  the  Demo¬ 
cratic  party  voted  for  Colonel  McClernand  this  session;  but  the  honorable  gentleman 
refused  to  vote  with  us.  I  ask  who  has  changed?  Who  is  it  that  is  advocating  “a  new 
dogma?” 

Mr.  CURRY.  Does  the  gentleman  speak  by  authority  when  he  says  Colonel  Orr  and 
Colonel  McClernand  entertain  the  same  sentiments  on  this  subject? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  Mr.  Chairman,  I  have  quoted  the  views  of  Colonel  Orr,  and 
whilst  I  will  not  say  that  I  speak  by  authority,  I  will  say  that  I  think  I  know  the  views 
of  Colonel  McClernand,  and  I  think  he  entirely  concurs  in  the  sentiments  expressed  by 
Colonel  Orr  in  1856. 

I  might  go  on  to  read  from  the  speeches  and  writings  of  other  southern  statesmen ;  and 
I  might  show  that  a  very  large  number  of  their  most  distinguished  men  have  held  the 
sentiments,  in  whole  or  in  part,  as  avowed  by  Judge  Douglas  ;  but  I  have  neither  the 
time  nor  the  disposition  to  do  so  now,  nor  do  I  esteem  it  necessary. 

But  I  intend  now  to  show  that  the  South  has  always,  in  the  Territories,  practiced  on 
and  acknowledged  the  doctrine  that  the  full  power  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery 
was  committed  to  the  Territories.  What  was  done  in  Kansas?  Was  not  the  whole 
difficulty  in  that  Territory  created  by  the  contest  for  the  election  of  the  Territorial  Legis¬ 
lature?  The  slave  State  men  struggling  to  get  possession  of  the  Legislature,  that  thejT 
might  enact  laws  to  establish  and  protect  slavery;  and  the  free  State  men  to  get  posses¬ 
sion  of  the  Legislature,  to  prohibit  and  abolish  slavery.  We  all  know  that  was  the  con¬ 
test,  and  the  cause  of  the  controversy.  The  slave  State  men  got  possession  of  the  Legis¬ 
lature,  and  we  all  know  that  their  first  work  was  to  pass  stringent  laws  establishing  and 
protecting  slave  property.  Now,  if  the  power  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery  was 
not  conferred  on  the  Territorial  Legislature,  all  this  legislation  was  void  and  illegal.  Did 
any  southern  statesman  then  aris^  in  Congress  and  propose  to  arrest  this  illegal  exercise 
of  legislation?  I  need  not  say  not  one.  If  you  had  not  conferred  on  the  Territorial  Legis¬ 
lature  full  power  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  why  were  so  many  thousand  dol¬ 
lars  spent  by  emigrant  aid  societies,  North  and  South,  to  send  emigrants  there  to  control 
the  election  of  the  Legislature?  If  the  Territorial  Legislature  had  not  the  power  to 
abolish  slavery,  you  might  just  as  well  have  let  the  free  State  men  had  possession  of  that 
bod}’;  for  they  could  do  nothing  to  infringe  }’our  rights.  Yet,  blood  was  shed,  civil  war 
raged,  and  battles  were  fought,  and  men  murdered,  and  homes  made  desolate,  to  maintain 
this  fruitless  power  of  legislating.  Ah,  gentlemen,  let  us  be  candid.  This  new  dogma  of 

congressional  intervention”  had  not  been  thought  of  then.  It  is  an  after  thought.  You 
have  changed  your  tactics;  and,  whilst  we  admit  your  right  to  change,  you  must  not  de¬ 
nounce  us  because  we  do  not  change  along  with  you.  Again:  if  the  Territorial  Legisla¬ 
tures  have  not  the  power  to  legislate  on  the  subject  of  slavery,  why  does  not  the  honor¬ 
able  gentleman  from  Alabama  move,  here  in  Congress,  to  declare  the  act  establishing 
slavery  in  New  Mexico  unconstitutional  and  void? 

Mr.  JENKINS.  Do  I  understand  the  gentleman  to  say  that  the  Territorial  Legisla¬ 
ture  has  the  power  to  protect  slavery  if  it  choose? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  Certainly.* 

Mr.  JENKINS.  I  understand  the  gentleman  to  say  also  that  Congress  has  not  the 
power  to  protect  slavery  in  the  Territories.  If# Congress  has  not  the  p  > wer,  under  what 
clause  of  the  Constitution  does  the  gentleman  ilnd  the  power  under  which  the  Territorial 
Legislature  can  protect  slavery  ? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  find  it  in  the  act  organizing  them  into  a  territorial  govern- 
ernment;  and  it  is  precisely  because  Congress  cannot  legislate  to  protect  slavery  that  the 
Territorial  Legislature  has  the  power  to  do  so.  If  Congress  had  that  power,  and  if  it 
was  made  the  duty  of  Congress  to  protect  slaveiy,  then  Congress  could  not  give  it  away, 
but  must  exercise  it.  I  have  been  striving  to  prove  this  fact  that  Congress  intended  to 
give  full  power  over  the  subject  of  slavery  to  the  Legislatures,  because  it  has  been  denied 
that  such  was  the  intention  when  the  Kansas-Nebraska  act  was  passed.  But  1  contend 
that,  without  any  such  legislation,  that  power  is  inherent  in  the  people  of  the  Territory; 


10 

and  so  soon  as  Congress  confers  on  them  a  territorial  government,  they  can  exercise  it, 
I  will  explain  my  understanding. 

It  is  admitted  that  the  right  of  legislation  is  inherent  in  the  citizens  of  each  State. 
Now,  I  desire  to  inquire,  when  a  citizen  emigrates  from  a  State  into  a  Territory,  where 
does  he  lose  “his  inherent  right"  of  self-government?  At  what  boundary  line  does  it 
drop  from  him  ?  We  read  in  Bunyan  that  Christian’s  sins  clung  to  his  back  like  a  knap¬ 
sack;  but,  at  last,  as  he  ascended  a  hill,  the  load  fell  off.  I  would  like  to  know  whether 
the  inherent  right  of  self-government,  drops  from  our  own  emigrant  in  the  same  way. 
And  I  would  like,  too,  to  know  at  what  precise  point  the  power,  which  shrouds  him  like 
a  mantle  in  the  States,  falls  from  his  shoulders  when  he  emigrates  to  a  Territory.  The 
advocates  of  congressional  intervention  can  see  how  the  rights  of  a  citizen  to  his  negro 
journey  with  him  from  the  State  where  he  resides  to  the  Territory  to  which  he  emigrates; 
but  the  same  gentlemen  are  entirely  at  a  loss  to  see  how  the  heaven-born  right  of  self- 
government  accompanies  a  man  on  the  same  journey.  The  truth  is,  that  the  right  in  a 
slave  seems  to  be  the  onlj"  right  which  they  consider  sacred.  I  maintain  that  the  right 
of  self-government  is  inherent ;  and  that  so  soon  as  Congress  recognizes  a  body  of  emi¬ 
grants  in  a  Territory  as  a  government,  their  right  of  self-government  comes  into  action, 
and  can  be  exercised.  And  even  without  any  such  act,  necessity  may  demand  its  ex¬ 
ercise.  This  right  of  self-government  in  the  people  was  directly  recognized  in  the  case 
of  California.  These  are  my  views.  But  I  was  proceeding  on  with  my  proof  that  Con¬ 
gress  desired  to  confer  on  the  Territorial  Legislatures  the  full  power  of  legislation  over 
the  subject  of  slavery.  And  I  will  now  resume  my  line  of  argument  on  that  point. 

Mr.  MILES.  I  dislike  to  interrupt  the  gentleman,  but  I  understand  his  time  has  been 
indefinitely  extended.  My  only  object  is  to  call  his  attention  to  this  point.  It  is  true,  as 
the  gentleman  says,  that  the  Territories  have  all  the  power  of  legislation  which  Congress 
can  confer  upon  them.  None  of  u's  deny  that.  And  it  is  also  true,  that  each  State  has 
the  entire  control  over  its  own  institutions.  It  has  the  right  to  place  whatever  features 
it  may  choose  upon  them.  None  of  us  deny  for  a  moment  that  it  may  exclude  slavery 
forever;  but  we  do  contend  that  a  Territorial  Legislature,  that  the  legislative  power  of 
a  Territory — which  is  the  creature  of  Congress,  w'hich  is  the  common  property  of  all  the 
States — shall  not  do  that  which  we  claim  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  cannot  do. 
"VVe  do  claim  that  it  is  impossible  for  the  inferior  to  exercise  a  right  of  supremacy,  when 
such  right  of  supremacy  does  not  exist  in  the  superior. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  certainly  thank  the  gentleman  for  his  admission.  It  is  a  very 
important  one.  He  admits  that  the  Territories  have  all  the  powers  of  legislation  which 
Congress  can  confer  upon  them.  This  is  admitted  in  the  presence  of  all  his  southern  col¬ 
leagues,  and  none  of  them  dissent  from  it.  It  is  an  admission  that  the  power  of  legisla¬ 
tion  was  fully  and  unequivocally  given  to  -the  Territorial  Legislature  by  Congress  in  their 
acts  organizing  temporary  governments.  I  am  glad  the  gentleman  has  admitted  this. 
It  is  the  first  time  the  admission  was  ever  made  by  an  advocate  of  congressional  inter¬ 
vention,  to  my  knowledge.  Hitherto,  indeed,  it  has  been  uniformly  denied  by  them. 
The  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama,  speaking  on  that  subject,  sa}’s: 

“  If,  on  any  subject,  the  will  of  the  Territory  is  not  supreme,  slavery  is  not  the  exception ;  for  the  great 
expounder  of  this  new  dogma  asserts  that  a  ‘  Territorial  Legislature  can  lawfully  exclude,  slavery,  either 
by  non-action  or  unfriendly  legislation.’  This  power  is  variously  derived — from  the  illegal  inherent  power 
of  self-government,  existing  in  every  distinct  political  community,  and  from  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  as 
indorsed  by  the  Cincinnati  platform.  To  the  first  derivation  I  have  no  answer  to  make  beyond  the  state¬ 
ment  that  it  is  in  entire  consistency  with  the  first  great  experiment  of  squatter  sovereignty — the  creation 
of  the  State  of  California,  whose  admission  into  the  Union,  under  the  circumstances,  was  the  most  un¬ 
paralleled  outrage  ever  perpetrated  on  a  people  pretending  to  be  free. 

“ To  the  second  source  of  power ,  I  reply  that ,  if  found  there,  the  South  teas  most  miserably  duped  in 
that  famous  measure  for  silencing  agitation.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  purpose  of  the  framer  of 
that  bill — and  he  says,  in  his  contribution  to  Harper,  that  it  was  to  remove  any  obstacle  to  the  free  exer¬ 
cise  of  popular  sovereignty — it  was  supported  at  the  Soutli  because  of  its  repeal  of  the  Missouri  restric¬ 
tion,  and  because  we  thought  we  had  secured  a  safeguard  against  territorial  unfriendly  legislation,  by  the 
provision  rendering  all  such  legislation  subject  to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  and  by  the  further 
provision  giving.an  appeal  to  the  courts  of  the  UAted  States,  in  all  cases  where  property  in  slaves  was  in¬ 
volved.  If  we  were  mistaken,  this  power  to  eafilude  slavery  by  unfriendly  legislation — this  squatter 
sovereignty  covered,  up)  under  ambiguous  language  in  the  Kansas  bill,  after  the  repeal  of  the  Missouri 
restriction — is  but  a  refined  imitation  of  the  barbarity  of  the  petty  Celtic  tyrant,  who  fed  his  prisoners  on 
salted  food  tili  they  called  eagerly  for  drink,  and  then  let  down  an  empty  cup  into  the  dungeon,  and  left 
them  to  die  of  thirst.” 

The  gentleman  from  Alabama  declares  that  if  such  power  is  found  in  the  Kansas-Ne¬ 
braska  bill,  “  the  South  was  most  miserably  duped  by  that  famous  measure.”  But  the  gen¬ 
tleman  from  South  Carolina,  with  a  candor  which  is  his  distinguishing  characteristic,  ad¬ 
mits  that  Congress  did  give  all  the  power  it  could  give,  and  therefore  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
bill  was  not  such  “  a  miserable  cheat,”  after  all.  And  if  Congress  intended  to  give  all 
that  power,  surely  it  intended  the  Territorial  Legislatures  should  exercise  it,  and  that 
they  could  exercise  it.  Your  denunciations,  if  any  are  due,  should  be  bestowed  on  Con¬ 
gress,  and  not  on  Judge  Douglas. 

But  the  honorable  gentleman  from  South  Carolina  insists  that,  as  Congress  has  not  the 
power  to  abolish  slavery,  therefore  it  cannot  confer  that  power  on  the  Territorial  Legis- 


0 


11 


latures.  “That,”  as  lie  says,  “the  inferior  cannot  exercise  a  right  of  supremacy,  when 
such  right  of  supremacy  does  not  exist  in  the  superior.” 

I  have  already  stated  that  I  claimed  that  the  right  of  self-government  was  inherent  in 
every  citizen  of  every  State  ;  and  that  it  travelled  with  such  citizen  wherever  he  went; 
and  that  the  power  to  abolish  slavery  sprung  from  such  right  of  self-government.  My 
object  in  showing  that  the  power  of  legislation  on  the  subject  of  slavery  was  intended  to 
be  conferred  by  Congress  when  the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill  was  passed,  was  to  prove  that 
this  was  not  a  “  nev)  dogma"  and  “  that  the  South  was  not  miserably  cheated;  but  that  the 
whole  subject  was  fully  and  clearly  understood,  and  that  Judge  Douglas  maintained  the 
same  views  then  that  he  does  now.  But  I  have  the  fact  that  it  was  the  intention  to  con¬ 
fer  such  power  admitted  now,  and  I  will  elaborate  that  branch  of  the  subject  no  further. 

The  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  maintains  that — 

“  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  discriminates  specially  in  favor  of  slave  property  ;  provides  for 
its  increase,  for  its  permanency,  for  its  security,  and  for  its  representation  in  this  body.  It  recognizes 
property  in  slaves ;  and  the  Supreme  Court  has  affirmed  our  right  to  emigrate  to,  and  occupy  with  slaves, 
the  common  territory ;  and  from  this  recognition  and  guarantee,  protection  is  an  inevitable  sequitur.  From 
the  premises,  the  sequence  cannot  be  resisted,  that  the  powers  of  the  Government  are  due  to  its  security.” 

I  must  confess  I  cannot  understand  what  the  honorable  gentleman  means  by  this.  If 
he  means  that  the  Constitution  establishes  slavery  in  the  Territory,  I  must  quote  Judge 
Black  in  reply,  who  says,  “that  nobody  ever  thought  or  said  so.”  If  he  merely  intends 
to  assert  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  recognizes  slaves  as  property,  1  admit 
it.  If  he  means,  however,  to  say  that  the  Constitution  places  property  in  slaves  higher 
than  other  property,  I  deny  it,  and  defy  the  proof.  The  gentleman,  however,  assures  us 
that  because  the  Constitution  recognizes  property  in  slaves,  that  it  follows  as  an  inevita¬ 
ble  sequitur  from  the  premises,  that  the  powers  of  Government  are  due  to  its  security.  I 
deny  this  “ inevitable  sequitur .”  The  Constitution  recognizes  property  of  every  kind  in 
every  State  and  Territory  of  the  Union.  But  it  by  no  means  follows  that  the  powers  of 
the  Government  are  due  to  the  protection  of  such  property.  If  that  were  true,  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  of  the  United  States  would  have  plenty  of  work  on  its  hands.  If  because  the 
Constitution  recognizes  property,  we  must  legislate  to  protect  it,  I  know  of  no  s'pecies  of 
property  which  we  would  not  be  bound  to  protect.  And  if  the  duty  of  legislation  to  pro¬ 
tect  propert}T  is  imposed  on  Congress  by  the  Constitution,  we  must  pass  laws  to  protect 
property  in  the  States  as  well  as  in  the  Territory.  We  have  but  one  Constitution,  and  if 
it  imposes  the  duty  on  Congress  to  protect  property,  -we  must  protect  it  wherever  it  exists. 
The  claim  is  not  that  we  should  protect  it  because  it  is  in  the  Territory ,  but  because  it  is 
property ,  recognized  as  such  in  the  Constitution.  The  gentleman’s  constitutional  power 
is  very  greatly  too  broad  for  his  purposes.  B^t  it  may  be  replied,  that  it  is  the  duty  of 
Congress  to  protect  property  in  the  Territories/  because  the  Territorial  Legislatures  can¬ 
not  do  so.  That  will  not  do ;  for  the  gentleman  is  constrained  to  admit  that  the  Territo¬ 
rial  Legislatures  can  protect  slave  property ;  and  that  the  slave  laws  of  Kansas  and  New 
Mexico  are  valid ;  and  if  they  can  protect  slave  property,  they  can  protect  all  other  kinds. 

The  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  is  a  State-right  Democrat,  and  contends  for  a 
strict  construction  of  the  Constitution.  He  can  claim  no  power  for  Congress  which  is  not 
expressly  granted.  Now,  where  is  the  grant  of  power  to  Congress  to  pass  laws  to  protect 
slave  property  ?  I  say  it  can  nowhere  be  found.  There  are  three  clauses  in  the  Consti¬ 
tution  on  the  subject  of  slavery.  The  first  provides  for  the  rendition  of  fugitive  slaves, 
and  certainly  confers  no  power  of  legislation  to  protect  slave  property  in  the  Territories. 
The  second  clause  relates  to  the  apportionment  of  representatives  to  Congress  on  the 
three-fifths  of  the  slave  population  of  the  slave  States.  It  will  hardly  be  claimed  that 
this  clause  gives  the  power  of  legislation  for  the  Territories.  The  third  and  last  clause 
on  the  subject,  provides  for  the  abolition  of  the  slave-trade — and  could  not  be  so  distort¬ 
ed  as  to  give  legislative  power  over  the  Territories.  There,  now,  are  all  the  clauses 
which  in  any  way  relate  to  slavery.  Will  the  friends  of  intervention  oblige  me  by 
pointing  out  on  which  of  them  they  will  risk  an  argument  to  sustain  their  claim  of  con¬ 
gressional  legislation? 

The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  provides  only  for  national  legislation.  No  power 
to  pass  laws  in  relation  to  the  domestic  institutions  was  incorporated  in  it.  That  kind  of 
legislation  belongs  exclusively  to  the  States,  and  cannot  be  exercised  by  Congress.  It  is 
folly  to  talk  about  it;  any  man  who  knows  the  first  principles  of  the  Constitution,  knows 
that  such  a  power  has  no  existence.  I  will  now  pass  to  the  objections  to  the  exercises  of 
this  power  by  the  Territories  themselves. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  Territorial  Legislatures  have  no  power  to  abolish  slavery,  or  to 
destroy  or  depreciate  slave  property,  for  the  reason  that  as  the  Constitution  recognizes 
property  in  slaves,  the  Territorial  Legislature  cannot  take  it  away.  And  that  is  in  fact 
the  point  to  which  the  advocates  of  congressional  intervention  are  driven.  And  a  more 
groundless  position  was  never  assumed.  What  is  the  position?  It  is  that  an  act  abolish¬ 
ing  slavery,  passed  by  a  Territorial  Legislature,  is  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States.  Let  me  ask  those  who  make  this  assertion,  to  point  out  the  clause  and  sec- 


12 


tion  of  the  Constitution  which  such  an  act  violates.  What  provision  or  feature  of  that 
instrument  prohibits  such  a  law  being  passed?  We  all  claim  to  be  in  favor  of  a  strict 
construction  of  the  Constitution,  and  surely  nothing  is  in  violation  of  that  instrument  un¬ 
less  it  is  in  contravention  of  some  of  its  provisions.  Now,  if  such  a  law  violates  the  Con¬ 
stitution,  the  clause  and  section  can  surely  be  found.  Yet  although  the  assertion  has  often 
been  made,  the  section  has  never  been  pointed  out;  and  what  is  more,  never  will  be  point¬ 
ed  out.  If  there  is  a  clause  in  the  Constitution  which  prohibits  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
it  is  just  as  applicable  to  a  State  as  a  Territory.  We  have  but  one  Constitution,  and  its 
provisions  apply  to  all  parts  of  the  country;  and  what  would  be  unconstitutional  in  a 
Territory,  must  be  unconstitutional  in  a  State;  and  if  any  provision  of  the  Constitution 
prohibits  the  passage  of  a  law  to  abolish  slavery,  then  all  those  laws  which  have  been 
passed  in  the  free  States  are  null  and  void,  and  slavery  exists  in  every  one  of  them. 

Mr.  MILES.  I  dislike  to  interrupt  the  gentleman,  but  I  think  he  does  not  see  the  point 
I  made  a  short  time  since.  lie  does  not  make  the  distinction  between  a  mere  act  of  legis¬ 
lation  and  an  act  of  sovereignty.  The  fact  of  abolishing  slavery  is  an  act  of  sovereignty 
which  every  sovereign  State  has  the  right  to  exercise;  but  it  is  not  a  rightful  subject  of 
legislation,  which  can  be  conferred  upon  a  territorial  government.  It  is  an  act  of  sover¬ 
eignty.  and  no  Territorial  Legislature  is  invested  with  the  powers  of  sovereignty. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  assure  the  honorable  gentleman  I  perfectly  comprehend  the 
point  he  has  made.  Bat  I  will  show  him  that  it  has  no  weight.  In  short,  that  it  is  a  high- 
sounding  phrase,  which  is  not  at  all  understood,  and  only  leads  to  confusion. 

Let  me  explain  the  matter.  The  allegation  is,  that  an  act  of  a  Territorial  Legislature, 
abolishing  slavery,  is  in  violation  of  the  Consttitution  of  the  United  States.  And  the  last 
vestige  ot  argument  left  to  sustain  it  is,  that  a  Territorial  Legislature  is  not  a  sovereignty , 
and  that  nothing  less  than  a  sovereign  power  can  abolish  slavery.  Now,  if  I  were  to  ad¬ 
mit  what  the  honorable  gentleman  asserts,  how  would  that  prove  that  such  a  law  is  in 
violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States?  If  the  gentlemen  would  argue  that 
such  a  law  was  void ,  for  want  of  authority  to  pass  it,  there  might  be  some  plausibility  in 
it.  But  how  he  can  manage  to  believe  it  unconstitutional,  I  cannot  conceive.  But  is  such 
a  law  void?  Certainly,  the  gentleman  says,  because  it  must  be  passed  by  a  sovereign 
Legislature.  By  sovereignty,  as  I  understand  it,  is  meant  the  supreme  legislative  power 
of  a  State  or  Territory.  Sovereignty  is  of  two  kinds,  absolute  and  qualilied.  There  is 
no  such  thing  as  an  absolute  legislative  sovereignty  in  our  country.  The  States  are  all 
qualified  or  limited  sovereignties,  because  they  are  in  subordination  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States.  The  General  Government  is  a  limited  sovereignty,  because  its  powers 
are  limited  and  restricted  by  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States ;  and  the  legislative 
sovereignty  of  the  Territories  is  limited  and  restricted  in  a  peculiar  manner.  A  Territory 
lias  as  extensive  a  legislative  sovereignty  as  a  State,  on  all  domestic  affairs.  It  has,  how¬ 
ever,  no  national  legislative  power  or  sovereignty.  It  gains  that  power  by  admission.  It 
gains  the  privilege  of  sending  Senators  and  Reprseutatives  to  Congress;  it  gains  the  right 
to  participate  in  the  election  of  a  President  of  the  nation;  the  organic  act  ceases  to  limit 
or  restrict  it;  but  it  gains  no  additional  legislative  power  in  regard  to  its  domestic  insti¬ 
tutions.  State  sovereignty  is  exclusively  domestic.  So  is  the  legislation  of  a  Territory; 
and,  in  that  respect,  a  Territory  gains  nothing  by  admission.  The  idea  that  a  Territory 
gains  the  power  of  domestic  legislation  by  admission  into  the  Union,  is  simply  absurd. 
The  General  Government  is  the  creature  of  the  States;  was  made  by  them  for  national 
purposes  only,  and  it  never  had  the  slightest  power  over  the  domestic  legislation  of  the 
States.  How,  then,  let  me  ask,  does  the  General  Government  confer  this  power  of  domes¬ 
tic  legislation  on  a  new  State  when  it  never  had  it  to  confer?  Judge  Douglas  tell  us  that 
the  sovereignty  of  a  Territory  is  held  in  abeyance  by  the  General  Government,  in  trust 
for  the  Territory.  By  which  he  clearly  means  those  powers  which  a  State  acquires  by 
admission,  which  is  the  right  to  participate  in  the  national  Legislature,  &c. 

Gentlemen  talk  of  State  constitutions  as  though  some  additional  power  of  legislation 
was  gained  from  them.  It  is  not  indispensably  necessary  that  a  State  should  have  a  con¬ 
stitution.  Rhode  Island  had  no  constitution  until  within  the  last  few  years.  A  constitu¬ 
tion  is  a  limitation  on  the  legislative  power  of  the  Legislature,  imposed  by  the  people  for 
their  own  security.  England  has  no  written  constitution;  therefore  Parliament  is  said  to 
be  omnipotent,  and  is  the  greatest  legislative  body  on  earth.  All  that  is  necessary  to  disa¬ 
buse  the  minds  of  gentlemen,  is  to  reflect  on  the  nature  of  the  subject  under  consideration. 

There  is  another  term  introduced  into  the  discussion  on  this  question  which  really  has 
no  meaning  in  the  connection  in  which  it  is  used.  Judge  Black,  in  his  article,  talks  of  an 
act  abolishing  slavery  as  confiscating  property.  I  defy  Judge  Black,  or  any  other  man,  to 
produce  any  respectable  legal  authority  that  has  ever  defined  a  law  abolishing  slavery  an 
act  of  confiscation.  But  to  please  the  Attorney  General,  and  those  who  agree  with  him, 
suppose,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  we  call  it  “confiscation.”  What  then?  Will  it  there¬ 
fore  follow  that  it  is  a  violation  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  to  pass  such  a 
law?  Certainly  not.  Such  an  act,  when  passed  by  a  Territorial  Legislature,  would  be 
no  more  unconstitutional  than  a  similar  act  would  be  when  passed  by  a  State  Legislature. 


13 


If  a  Territorial  Legislature  does  not  possess  the  power  to  divest  the  title  of  property, 
our  Territories  are  in  a  sad  condition.  It  has  been  decided  that  a  man  has  a  property  in 
his  wife.  And  he  can  maintain  an  action  to  recover  possession  of  her  person.  Yet  the 
Territorial  Legislatures,  indisputably,  can  grant  a  divorce,  and  divest  his  title.  The  Ter¬ 
ritorial  Legislatures  create  city  corporations.  These  corporations  all  exercise  the  power 
of  eminent  domain  and  divest  the  titles  of  owners  of  lands  taken  for  streets,  public  high¬ 
ways,  and  public  buildings.  Yet,  if  the  doctrine  contended  for  by  the  congressional  in¬ 
terventionists  is  correct,  all  these  divorces  are  void,  and  all  these  streets,  highways,  and 
public  buildings  are  the  property  of  the  land-owners.  A  thousand  illustrations  equally 
as  clear  might  be  given  to  show  the  folly  of  such  reasoning. 

But  if  we  were  to  admit  all  that  is  contended  for,  it  only  presents  a  legal  question. 
The  contest  is,  whether  an  act  of  a  Territorial  Legislature,  abolishing  slavery,  is  a  viola¬ 
tion  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States  or  not.  This  is,  therefore,  purely  a  legal 
question,  which  the  courts  alone  can  determine.  Fifty  centuries  of  legislation  could  not 
alter  the  Constitution,  nor  determine  the  question.  Why,  then,  should  the  gentleman 
from  Alabama  drag  this  controversy  before  this  House  ?  We  have  no  power  to  pass  upon 
nor  to  determine  it.  Judge  Douglas  has  declared  his  willingness  to  submit  the  question 
to  the  determination  of  the  courts,  and  to  abide  by  and  carry  out  the  decision  which  may 
be  made.  What  grounds  has  any  one  to  complain  of  his  position  ?  If  the  Judges  of  the 
Supreme  Court  were  elected  by  a  vote  of  the  people,  and  Judge  Douglas  were  a  candidate 
for  a  judgeship,  his  legal  opinions  might  be  regarded  as  important.  But  he  is  not  likely 
to  get  on  the  supreme  bench.  And  he  might  even  be  mistaken  on  a  law  question  without 
shaking  our  confidence  in  his  Democracy.  But  suppose  the  doctrine  of  congressional  in¬ 
tervention  were  established  by  the  Supreme  Court :  there  is  not  a  single  Territory  wheie 
such  a  law  is  now  demanded.  There  is  no  such  law  pending,  nor  is  there  the  least  pros¬ 
pect  that  it  will  ever  be  necessary  to  propose  such  legislation.  How  visionary  and  ab¬ 
stract  this  question  is.  Yet  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Alabama  expects  it  to  convulse 
the  nation  North  and  South,  to  divide  the  Democratic  party,  wreck  the  hopes  of  Judge 
Douglas,  and  control  the  Charleston  Convention.  The  dream  is  worse  than  Utopian. 

The  gentleman  from  Alabama  is  not  wdlling  to  submit  the  question  to  the  courts.  But 
let  him  speak  for  himself: 

“It  may  be  said  that  these  are  judicial  questions  and  mere  abstractions,  which  can  be  safely  left  to  the 
future,  to  be  determined  as  exigencies  may  arise.  In  a  late  memorable  case,  appeals  have  been  made 
from  the  Supreme  Court  to  popular  prejudice  and  passion,  and  interpretations  of  the  decision  form  parts 
of  political  platforms.  History  is  full  of  instances  of  judicial  subserviency,  and  political  opinion  very  often 
control  judicial  conduct.  The  famous  Somersett  case,  the  direful  spring  of  unnumbered  woes,  was  decided 
under  circumstances  that  reflect  no  credit  on  the  moral  courage  of  the  eminent  judge.  The  proposition  of 
Senator  Seward,  to  put  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  side  of  freedom,  is  fearfully  admonitory  of  the  influence 
of  popular  excitement  on  the  judiciary.  If  I  could  lift  my  voice  so  as  to  be  heard  ;  if  she  would  heed  the 
admonition  of  a  loyal  son,  in  tones  of  earnest  entreaty,  I  would  beseech  her  not  again  to  commit  the  fatal 
mistake  of  yielding  to  party  necessity  what  may  he  essential  to  future  safety;  not-  to  concede  a  principle, 
which,  however  apparently  abstract  or  impracticable,  may,  in  the  hands  of  hostility  or  fanaticism,  prove  a 
potent  engine  of  mischief  or  destruction.” 

The  gentleman  is  unwilling  to  submit  this  question,  because  “in  a  recent  memorable 
case  appeals  have  been  made  from  the  Supreme  Court  to  popular  prejudice  and  passion.” 
This  was  all  very  wrong,  doubtless;  but  pray  what  has  that  to  do  with  the  election  of 
Judge  Douglas  to  the  Presidency?  Is  it  pretended  that  if,  for  instance,  Colonel  Davis,  of 
Mississippi,  were  elected  President,  that  such  “appeals  to  popular  prejudice  and  passion” 
would  not  be  taken?  The  honorable  gentleman  expresses  the  greatest  abhorrence  to 
dragging  the  decisions  of  the  courts  into  the  political  arena,  and  taking  “appeals  from  the 
legal  determinations  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  popular  prejudice  and  passions,”  yet  he  hesi¬ 
tates  not  to  arraign  Judge  Douglas  for  entertaining  a  legal  opinipn;  and  instead  of  refer¬ 
ring  the  question  to  the  Supreme  Court  for  adjudication,  he  appeals  to  the  popular  preju¬ 
dices  and  passions  of  a  slaveholding  people.  “Oh,  consistency,  thou  art  indeed  a  jewel!  ” 

The  truth  is,  the  gentleman  evidences  clearly  his  unwillingness  to  trust  the  court  with 
the  question,  Perhaps  more  political  capital  could  be  made  if  this  question  were  not  de¬ 
termined.  The  committee  will  judge  of  the  motive  which  prompts  the  refusal  of  the 
opponents  of  Judge  Douglas  to  submit  this  vexed  question  to  adjudication. 

Before  I  have  done,  I  must  give  the  committee  the  gentleman  from  Alabama’s  “slave- 
code”  He  informs  us: 

“Slavery  exists  in  the  State  where  the  owner  dwells,  exists  out  of  the  State,  exists  in  the  Territories,  or¬ 
iels  everywhere,  until  it  comes  within  the  limits  of  a  sovereignty  which  prohibits  it.  The  Constitution,  as 
that  profound  lawyer  and  statesman,  Judge  Berrien,  argued,  recognizes  slavery  in  a  free  State  ;  speaks  of 
it,  in  such  free  State,  as  an  actually  subsisting  debt  of  service  or  labor,  and  prohibits  the  discharge  of  the 

slave.” 

I  think  this  will  rather  take  the  legal  portion  of  this  House  by  surprise.  It  is  evident, 
if  this  definition  is  correct,  that  slavery  is  universal.  Law  is  divided  into  two  kinds — the 
laws  of  God,  and  the  laws  of  man.  If  the  gentleman’s  doctrine  is  correct,  slavery  exists 
by  virtue  of  the  law  of^God;  and,  if  that  i3  true,  he  may  bid  defiance  to  every  attempt 
to  abolish  it,  for  man  cannot  repeal  the  law  of  God. 


14 

Mr.  BARKSDALE.  Do  you  contend  that  the  Territorial  Legislature  cannot  divest  the 

title  to  a  horse? 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  If  the  owner  obtains  his  title  from  God,  certainly  not. 

Mr.  BARKSDALE.  Then  you  differ  with  Judge  Douglas. 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY.  I  think  not.  But  I  care  not  who  I  differ  with.  I  am  correct. 

The  gentleman  from  Alabama  next  informs  us  what  we  should  fight  for.  Hear  him: 

“Mr.  Chairman,  for  what  is  the  Democratic  party  contending?  Is  it  for  spoils  and  patronage,  or  for 
principle?  Is  this  immense'array  of  means,  this  combination  of  agencies,  this  drilling  lor  the  strife,  but 
to  win  a  victory,  barren  and  fruitless  and  I’yrrhan  ?  Are  we  to  struggle  for  a  President,  merely  to  dispense 
executive  patronage  and  feed  a  greedy  swarm  of  leeches?  This  is  of  no  avail,  is  mischievous,  unless  ac¬ 
companied  by  practical  results,  by  a  triumph  of  principle.” 

I  agree  with  him  entirely  that  we  fight  for  principles.  But  I  have  always  found  it  of 
highest  importance  in  such  battles  to  have  men  to  carry  out  the  principles  for  which  we 
contend.  If  we  cannot  elect  our  men,  how  can  we  carry  out  our  principles?  To  nomi¬ 
nate  a  man  who  is  certain  to  be  defeated,  is  to  sacrifice  our  principles,  and  to  lose  the 
control  of  the  Government.  But  such  are  the  expedients  to  which  those  who  oppose  the 
nomination  of  Judge  Douglas  are  driven.  They  admit  his  great  popularity;  they  admit 
that  his  nomination  is  equivalent  to  an  election.  But  they  raise  the  cry  that  he  holds 
some  erroneous  principles  on  abstract  and  legal  questions.  In  short,  that  he  is  not  a  good 
lawyer.  Why  did  not  the  gentleman  from  Alabama  march  boldly  up  to  the  mark,  and 
tell  this  House  that  he  preferred  the  election  of  Mr.  Seward  to  that  of  Mr.  Douglas;  for 
that  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  paragraph  which  I  have  just  quoted.  I  am  constrained 
to  differ  with  the  honorable  gentleman.  I  am  for  Douglas  and  victory;  and  so,  I  think, 
are  the  southern  people. 

[Mr.  Montgomery’s  time  having  expired,  a  debate  ensued  as  to  extending  it,  in  which 
Messrs.  Lovejoy,  Conkling,  Underwood,  and  Burnett  participated.  It  was  unanimously 
agreed  to  permit  Mr.  Montgomery  to  proceed.] 

Mr.  MONTGOMERY".  I  am  duly  sensible  of  the  kindness  the  House  has  done  me,  and 
I  assure  you,  Mr.  Chairman,  and  my  fellow-members,  that  I  am  profoundly  grateful. 

The  honorable  gentleman  tells  us  that  Alabama  will  not  submit  to  the  nomination,  un¬ 
less  we  indorse  the  doctrine  of  congressional  intervention.’  I  am  persuaded  the  delegates 
from  Alabama  will  not  withdraw  from  the  convention.  But  if  they  do,  and,  if  that  is 
agreed  upon  and  settled,  I  for  one  would  say  that  they  should  not  be  permitted  to  take 
seats  in  that  body.  I  recognize  the  right  of  no  set  of  men  to  go  into  a  convention  by 
whose  action  they  are  not  willing  to  be  bound.  That  is'not  Democracy.  But  if  they 
are  admitted,  and  if  they  do  not  withdraw,  and  Judge  Douglas  is  nominated, — and  I  as¬ 
sure  the  gentleman  from  Alabama  that  he  will  be  nominated  as  certainly  as  that  the  con¬ 
vention  assembles — he  will  still  carry  Alabama  at  the  election;  and  not  only  Alabama,  but 
every  other  southern  State.  The  hearts  of  the  people  of  this  country  are  with  him.  And 
such  a  shout  of  joy  will  go  up  over  his  nomination  as  has  never  gone  up  since  the  nomi¬ 
nation  of  General  Jackson.  I  have  heard  it  said  that  some  of  the  delegates  from  Ala¬ 
bama  would  not  withdraw;  and  I  have  heard  it  said  further,  that  although  all  those  dele¬ 
gates  will  carry  out,  in  good  faith,  their  instructions,  yet,  that  after  all  hope  of  nominating 
their  candidate  has  been  relinquished,  some  of  them  would  support  the  nomination  of 
Judge  Douglas. 

I  am  well  aware  of  the  game  of  brag., which  i3  being  played  by  those  who  oppose- the 
nomination  of  Judge  Douglas.  Small  politicians  and  professional  place  Seekers  assure 
their  friends  that  their  favorite  candidates  will  certainly  succeed.  With  an  air  of  pro¬ 
voking  wisdom  and  self  complacency,  one  of  these  men  will  assure  you  that  his  candidate, 
who  has  carried  just  half  a  State ,  is  as  certain  of  the  nomination  as  if  he  had  it ;  another, 
with  prophetic  fervor,  Announces  that  his  candidate,  who  lost  his  own  State  and  has  car¬ 
ried  no  other,  will  become  so  popular  at  Charleston,  that  the  presidential  mantle  will  by 
common  consent  be  cast  upon  his  shoulders.  These  are  the  little  tricks  of  paltry  office- 
seekers,  and  are  believed  by  nobody,  and  can  deceive  nobody.  The  man  who  has  no  pop¬ 
ularity  but  such,  as  he  acquires  at  Charleston  would  be  a  sorry  candidate  for  the  Democratic 
party.  The  man  who  is  nominated  should  bring  his  nomination  from  the  people,  who 
stand  above  the  delegates,  and  we  should  shun  conspiracies  and  combinations  as-we  would 
shun  the  leprosy.  This  is  the  Government  of  the  people,  and  the  people  shall  and  will 
rule.  Your-  delegates  may  conspire  and  combine  to  make  nominations,  but  what  is  the 
advantage  of  a  nomination  when  it  only  brings  defeat  and  dishonor? 

There  can  be  no  mistake  about  the  popular  feeling  on  this  question  ;  all  men  know  it. 
To  attempt  to  disobey  it  is  to  invite  defeat.  When  I  hear  a  delegate  say  that  he  “intends 
to  keep  his  mind  suspended  until  he  gets  to  Charleston,”  1  set  him  down  as  a  man  who  is 
ready  to  enter  into  a  conspiracy  to  betray  the  people  he  represents.  For  I  know  that  he 
knows  that  there  is  to  be  no  intellectual  bonfire  at  Charleston  to  enlighten  his  under¬ 
standing  as  to  the  proper  choice  of  a  candidate.  Such  a  man  knows  all  about  the  candi¬ 
dates  now;  but  he  intends  to  await  his  chance  to  betray.  When  I  hear  a  man  say  he 
will  support  a  certain  candidate  if  he  finds  the  South  will  submit ,  I  set  him  down  as  a  poor? 


15 


i 


miserable  “dough-face,”  who,  instead  of  choosing  the  candidate  his  own  people  want,  will 
let  others  dictate  his  vote  and  control  his  influence  by  their  threats  and  violence.  When 
I  hear  that  certain  delegates  will  refuse  to  obey  the  instructions  given  by  their  Slate  con¬ 
vention,  I  am  satisfied  that  they’  know  their  price,  and  have  found  a  purchaser.  But  woe 
betide  the  recreant  traitor  who  betrays  and  insults  his  people.  Their  curses,  hissing  hot, 
shall  follow  him  through  life,  and  roll  like  lava  over  his  grave  when  life  is  done.  Con¬ 
spirator*  may  plot,  combinations  may  be  formed,  and  nominations  may  be  made,  in  viola¬ 
tion  of  public  sentiment  and  the  papular  will,  but  the  day  of  election  will  be  a  day  of 
rebuke,  disaster,  and  irretrievable  defeat.  But  I  hope’ for  better  things.  I  will  not  be¬ 
lieve  the  rumors  of  knaves  and  impostors.  Men,  whose  names  stand  high  on  the  roll  of 
fame,  will  not  bring  down  on  themselves  an  eternity  of  infamy  by  the  polluting  touch  of 
disgraceful  conspiracies.  I  will  not  believe  it  ;  such  things  dare  not  be  done.  Our  dele¬ 
gates  are  not  marketable  commodities.  They  are  all  honorable  men,  and  will  do  their 
duty.  The  will  of  the  people  will  be  regarded.  The  nomination  of  Judge  Douglas  is  a 
foregone  conclusion,  and  gentlemen  may  as  well  prepare  to  meet  it.  •  “Coming  events 
cast  their  shadows  before,”  and  the  shadow  of  his  overwhelming  popularity  is  now 
upon  us. 

•  ■  The  gentleman  from  Alabama  could  not  close  his  remarks  without  dragging  up  the 

ghost  of  the  Lecompton  constitution.  I  thought  that  question  was  put  forever  to  rest. 
We  buried  both  Lecompton  and  anti-Lecompton  over  at  the  Heading  convention,  and  we 
are  not  willing  that  their  grave  shall  be  disturbed.  Wisdom  requires  that  we  should  for¬ 
get  our  past  differences,  and  that  every  one  of  us  should  contribute  his  whole  influence  to 
bring  the  whole  force  of  the  party  to  act  together.  We  must  unite  the  party  for  the  sake 
of  the  union  of  States.  We  must  unite  the  party  to  repress  “the  irrepressible  conflict.” 
The  Republicans  should  feel  profoundly  grateful  to  the  honorable  gentleman  from  Ala¬ 
bama,  for  his  effort  to  distract  and  divide  the  party  on  an  abandoned  issue  of  the  past. 
I  can  assure  the  gentleman  that  he  has  been  doing  Mr.  Seward  yeoman’s  service  by  his 
efforts  to  alienate  the  hearts  of  one  portion  of  the  Democracy  from  the  other.  Look 
around  you  to-day  on  the  vacant  seats  which  that  unfortunate  question  has  made  in  this 
Hall.  Where  are  the  noble  and  true  men  from  the  North,  who  two  years  since  came  at 
every  call  of  danger,  and  stood  like  a  wall  of  fire  between  the  South  and  her  Republican 
enemies?  They  have  gone  down  under  the  load  of  odium  attached  to  the  miserable  at¬ 
tempt  to  force  a  constitution  on  an  unwilling  people.  These  vacant  seats  have  a  inoral  as 
well  as  a  history.  Let  us  profit  by  the  one  and  not  forget  the  other. 

Intelligent.men  all  over  the  land  are  now  billing  to  admit  the  folly  of  that  unfortunate 
.  movement ;  and  thousands  of  men,  South  as  well  as  North,  agree  with  Senator  Hammond, 
of  South  Carolina,  in  saying  that  “ the  South,  herself  should  have  kicked  that  constitution 
out  of  Congress,”  thrust  upon  it  as  it  was  all  “  reeking  with  blood  and  fraud.”  The  whole 
attempt  was  a  miserable  failure,  an  undoubted  mistake.  And  now,  when  the  people  of 
Kansas  have  repudiated  that  constitution  by  a  majority  of  nearly  ten  thousand;  and 
after  we  have  seen  the  Democratic  party  defeated  throughout  the  whole  North  except  in 
Illinois,  on  account  of  it ;  and  when  wise  and  conservative  men  in  all  sections  of  the  Union 
look  back  to  that  controversy  with  regret  and  shame,  I  think  it  was  well  that  the  honora¬ 
ble  gentleman  should  assure  us  that  amidst  this  general  change  of  opinion  he  still  stands 
firm  for  old  Lecompton.  We  might  else  have  considered  that  the  general  feeling  had  pen¬ 
etrated  his  breast,  and  that  he  too  now  wished  it  had  been  “kicked  from  the  Halls  of 
Congress.”  The  Lecompton  constitution  cannot  now  ever  come  back  to  this  House  to  be 
legislated  upon.  It  is  as  foreign  from  all  present  political  issues  as  the  United  States 
Bank;  but  the  gentleman  introduced  it  into  this  discussion,  because  he  thereby  hoped  to 
arouse  sopie  of  the  old  southern  prejudice  on  that  question. 

Is  it  not  strikingly  singular  that  in  this  Had  we  hear  almost  every  day  denunciations  of 
Judge  Douglas  by  the  Republicans,  because,  as  they  say,  he  has  always  betrayed  the 
North  for  the  benefit  of  the  South.  Yet  in  this  same  Hall  we  hear  southern  Representa¬ 
tives  denounce  Judge  Douglas,  because  he  has  done  too  much  for  the  North  and  not 
enough  for.  the  South.  “Truth”  in  this,  as  in  most  cases,  “lies  in  the  golden,  mean.” 
Judge  Douglas,  in  his  long  and  honorable  career  in  Congress,  has  betrayed  neither  side; 
but  has  been  true  to  all  sections.  Like  every  great,  intelligent  patriot  and  statesman,  he 
has  legislated  for  the  nation,  and  not  for  particular  sections.  lie  loved  Illinois  much;  but 
he  has  loved  America  more.  Let  Alabama  read  his  history,  and  point  to  the  time  when 
he  ever  betrayed  her  interest  or  proved  false  to  his  Democratic  principles. 

•There  were  traits  of  character  developed  in  Judge  Douglas  during  that,  contest — now 
that  the  controversy  is  forever  ended — which  give  him  new  claims  on  the  hearts  and  af¬ 
fections  of  the  people,  and  which  inspire  his  friends  with  a  confidence  in  his  honesty  and 
integrity  greater  than  all  the  acts  of  the  rest  of  his  life  beside.  In  1857,  when  the  Le¬ 
compton  controversy  arose,  the  nomination  of  Judge  Douglas,  after  the  expiration  of  Mr. 
Buchanan’s  term,  was  a  fact  that  seemed  to  admit  of  no  contest.  The  presidential  mantle 
was  ready  to  fall  upon  his  shoulders.  When  that  question  arose,  he  found  arrayed  on  one 
side  of  it  the  southern  Democracy,  with  whom  lie  had  done  battle  in  so  many  years  of  the 


I 


16 


past;  lie  found  an  Administration  in  the  zenith  of  its  power,  with  all  its  patronage  and 
influence  ready  to  strike  him  down  if  he  dared  to  resist;  he  saw  the  bright  prize  of  the 
Presidency,  which  before  seemed  so  near,  ready  to  be  forever  withdrawn  from  hirfi,  unless 
he  would  sacrifice  his  honor  and  prove  recreant  to  the  high  principles  of  his  life,  yet  he 
never  hesitated  nor  faltered  for  a  moment.  He  displayed  no  wavering  nor  time-serving. 
He  knew  well  the  fearful  nature  of  the  contest  in  which  he  was  about  to  engage;  yet,  on 
the  very  day  on  which  the  President  sent  his  message  to  the  Senate,  and  before  the  sounds 
of  the  Clerk’s  voice  had  died  away  in  the  Senate  Chamber,  he  arose  and  entered  bi3  manly, 
bold,  and  decided  protest  against  it.  Throw  aside  your  political  prejudices;  cease  to  re¬ 
member  your  Lecompton  partisanship,  and  behold  and  admire  the  sublimity  of  moral 
heroism  in  the  man. 

We  had  known  and  loved  him  before.  But  then  we  saw  that  he  was  indeed  one  of 
“nature’s  noblemen” — a  “hero  from  the  hand  of  God.”  We  knew  that  for  seventeen 
years  he  had  originated  the  political  issues  on  which  parties  were  divided  and  Presidents 
made;  we  knew  that  in  every  contest  he  had  led  our  forces  to  battle,  and  won  our  proud¬ 
est  victories;  we  had  seen  his  firmness  of  soul  when  he  was  burned  in  effigy  in  Boston, 
and  when  he  was  insulted  by  a  mob  in  Chicago,  because  he  advocated  the  passage  of  the 
fugitive  slave  law ;  we  had  been  lost  in  admiration,  after  the  city  councils  of  Chicago  had 
passed  resolutions  denouncing  him  as  a  recreant  and  unfaithful  representative,  and  the 
fugitive  slave  law  as  unconstitutional  and  tyrannical,  when  he  boldly  demanded  a  hear¬ 
ing,  and  invited  his  assailants  to  meet  him  in  discussion  in  that  infuriated  city  ;  we  had 
never  ceased  to  wonder  at  the  matchless  power  of  reasoning  which  enabled  him  to  con¬ 
vince,  not  only  Chicago,  but  the  nation,  that  the  fugitive  slave  law  was  not  only  consti¬ 
tutional,  but  just  and  proper;  we  knew  that  when  he  spoke,  thousands  filled  the  galleries 
and  crowded  the  avenues  to  the  Capitol,  and  that  even  the  ladies,  in  their  eagerness  to 
hear  “the  winged  words”  as  they  fell  from  his  lips,  invaded  the  Senate  Chamber  and 
drove  the  gallant  Senators  from  their  seats;  we  knew  that  when  lie  spoke  all  men  were 
silent ;  we  knew  that  when  he  arose  his  enemies  trembled,  for  they  knew  he  was  covered 
all  over  in  impenetrable  armor,  and  that  liis  battle-axe  would  strike  down  the  greatest  of 
his  foes;  we  knew  he  was  the  king  of  the  Senate,  and  the  greatest  living  debater;  we 
knew  that  then,  as  now,  when  the  Democratic  party  was  assailed,  las  shield  always  was 
interposed  to  receive  the  blow ;  but  we  did  not  know  that  he  would  sacrifice  the  brightest 
hopes  of  his  life,  rather  than  desert  a  principle;  and  that  he  would  rather  he  right  than  to 
he  President!  This  was  all  shown  in  the  Lecompton  controversy;  and  men  love  and 
admire  him  for  it,  and  will  confide  the  Government  of  the  nation  to  his  hands,  because 
he  is  incorruptibly  honest,  as  well  as  capable.  He  is  the  hero  of  the  people — “  the  blue¬ 
eyed  man  of  destiny.”  The  paths  of  right  and  principle,  which  once  seemed  to  carry 
him  away  from  the  Presidency,  are  found,  at  last,  to  lead  to  the  White  House  door,  and 
to  its  inner  chambers.  And  he  who  \va3  once  the  cabinet-maker’s  boy  will  soon  himself 
be  the  maker  of  Cabinets. 

Of  all  the  Presidents  who  have  ruled  over  this  nation,  I  think  General  Jackson  has  the 
deepest  hold  on  the  popular  heart.  That  enduring  fame,  that  wealth  of  love  which  at¬ 
taches  to  his  memory,  does  not  arise  from  his  great  military  services.  It  does  not  spring 
from  his  veto  of  the  United  States  Bank,  nor  from  any  one  act  of  his  administration;  but 
from  a  glorious  principle  which  underlaid  all  the  acts  of  his  public  life,  and  is  embodied 
in  those  emphatic  words,  “The  Federal  Union:  it  must  and  shall  be  preserved.”  That  is 
the  sentiment  which  makes  the  people  love  and  worship  him,  and  makes  his  grave  a  Mecca, 
to  which  the  heart  of  the  nation  turns  in  every  day  of  clanger  to  pray  that  our  ruler  may 
have  the  spirit  of  the  glorious  Jackson.  Over  that  grave  a  golden  haze  lingers  like  a 
halo,  and  on  its  arch  is  written,  in  letters  of  flame,  the  “Federal  Union  :  it  must  and  shall 
be  preserved.”  Yes,  General  Jackson  was  true  to  bis  country;  and  wherever  treason 
and  disunion  reared  their  front,  his  hand  and  his  voice  were  against  them.  Since  his 
death  secession  and  disunion  have  grown  bold,  both  North  and  South.  But  I  do  thank 
God  that  no  disunionist,  in  either  section  of  the  land,  is  in  favor  of  the  nomination  of 
Judge  Douglas.  They  are  men  who  disguise  their  opposition  under  the  pretext  of  “con¬ 
gressional  intervention.”  Refusing  themselves  to  be  bound  by  the  action  of  Democratic 
conventions,  they  yet  claim  the  right  to  dictate  our  principles  and  control  our  nominations. 
They  are  weak  in  numbers  but  loud  in  their  denunciations.  They  hope  to  appear  strong 
by  assuming  airs  of  confidence  and  boldness.  We  know  that  their  yells  will  go  up  against 
Judge  Douglas  at  Charleston;  but  they  will  find  that  they  cannot  frighten  the  delegates 
from  the  discharge  of  their  duty.  We  will  meet  them  there,  as  we  meet  them  here,  and 
bid  defiance  to  their  power  and  their  influence.  The  whole  public  life  of  Judge  Douglas 
has  been  devoted  to  strengthen  and  preserve  the  Union.  His  motto  has  ever  been,  “My 
country,  may  she  ever  be  right;  but  right  or  wrong ,  my  country  /” 


